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HOLDER IN DUE COURSE IN CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS: REQUIEM, REVIVAL,
OR REFORMATION?
Ralph J. Rohnert
It is hard, and it becomes each year harder, for counsel to
explain convincingly why "the law" requires that a hard-pressed
wage-earner who has been bilked by a now-insolvent seller into
buying junk masquerading as a television set or a washing
machine must pay the full price to a bank or finance company
whose own relationship with the fraudulent seller has been
intimate, long-continued and profitable."
No area of consumer protection has produced as much nearreligious ferment in recent years as that collection of rules which
insulate third party financers from product-related claims or de4
3
2
fenses of consumer purchasers. Courts, legislatures, agencies,
t Professor of Law, the Catholic University of America. A.B. 1960, J.D. 1963, The
Catholic University of America.
I Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1098
(1954).
2 The case law is too plentiful to be collected into a single footnote, but is discussed
throughout the balance of this Article. Epitomizing the cases is Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 405 (1967), in wbich the New Jersey Supreme Court denied holder in due course
status to a finance company on the basis of extensive and dose connections between it and
the seller. This oft-cited, lengthy opinion is now a departure point for most discussions of
holder in due course; it has also become the standard law school casebook vehicle for
treating the issue. See, e.g., R. BRAUCHER & A. SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 277
(4th ed. 1968); V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, COMMERCIAL LAw 383 (1971); H. KRIPKE,
CONSUMER CREDIT 239 (1970); A. MALESON, B. CALLAHAN & J. BEARD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL LAW 956 (2d ed. 1972); R. NORDSTROM & A. CLOVIS,
COMMERCIAL PAPER 341 (1972); R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 606 (2d ed. 1974).
3 Upwards of 35 jurisdictions have restricted holder in due course to some degree, by

statute. See Willier, Needfor Preservationof Buyers' Defenses--State Statutes Reviewed, 5 UCC L.J.
132 (1972); notes 88-104 and accompanying text infra.
" Cf. Revised Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers'

Claims and Defenses §§ 433.1-.4, 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Proposed FTC Rule].
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commissions, 5 and commentators 6 have assailed the holder in due
course idea from all directions, so far as its application in consumer
transactions is concerned. The cloud of rhetoric thus raised has
tended to obscure the complexity of the subject, state only imperfectly the significant considerations, and oversimplify the appropriate legal responses. Moreover, the focus of much of this recent
discussion has been on traditional notions of holder in due course.
There are now important new developments in the form of the
recommendations of the National Commission on Consumer Finance,7 a completely redrafted 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 8 a new Model Consumer Credit Act9 drafted by the National
Consumer Law Center, the possibly imminent promulgation of a
holder in due course Trade Regulation Rule a0 by the Federal
Trade Commission, and, most recently, the enactment of a federal
statute limiting holder in due course application in credit card
transactions."a This Article takes up the changing shape of the
holder in due course controversy and outlines grounds for consensus as to future legislative policy.
I

NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES

xvii, 34-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
6 The literature is voluminous. For significant recent contributions see Countryman,
The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in Consumer Credit, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 1
(1973); Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39
S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966); Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans
and Credit Card Transactions-Recent Statutes, Policies, and a Proposal, 1973 WiS. L. REv. 471;
Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-ofDefense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667 (1968); Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who
Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. Riv. 375 (1971).
7 NCCF REPORT.
8 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM CONSUMER

CREDIT CODE (1974 version) [hereinafter cited as 1974 UCCC; original version cited as 1969

UCcC].
9 MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT (1973) [hereinafter cited as MCCA]. This Act is not
without predecessor. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT (1970) [hereinafter cited as NCA].
10 1973 Proposed FTC Rule.
11 Depository Institutions Amendments of 1974, tit. IlI, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 170, 88
Stat. 1500 (Fair Credit Billing Act § 170) [hereinafter cited as FCBA]. This title amends and
adds to the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II1,
1973)), which in turn is part of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. Id. §§ 1601-81t
(1970), as amended, (Supp. I11, 1973); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970).
Hearings were held on the proposed Fair Credit Billing Act in 1971 and 1973. Hearings
on S. 652 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings];
Hearings on S. 1630 and S. 914 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Senate Hearings].

1975]

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
I
THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE CONCEPT

"Holder in due course" used to be a term of art, confined to
the law of bills and notes, describing by very precise criteria the
special status of certain transferees of negotiable paper. The gist of
the holder in due course theory 12 was that the bona fide purchaser
for value of a note or draft duly negotiated to him in an arm'slength transaction could enforce the instrument against a maker,
drawer, or indorser free of most claims and personal defenses of
such a defendant. The desirability of holder in due course status
for anyone regularly purchasing commercial paper was obvious: to
the extent he took free of claims and defenses he reduced his risks
of nonrecovery and shunted to the consumer the risk of the
merchant's default or insolvency. It is hardly surprising, then, that
the various institutional financers who underwrite the billions of
dollars of consumer credit presently outstanding 13 have sought
holder in due course status, or its equivalent, for themselves. In the
process, "holder in due course" has come to describe an array of
techniques-some contractual, some statutory-by which creditors
seek to insulate themselves from claims or defenses arising out of
the underlying consumer transaction. A brief review of these
techniques and their effects on consumer debtors will be useful.
"2 See generally W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES ch. 3 (2d ed.
1961); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ch. 14 (1972). For the principal statutory provisions on holder in due course see
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-301-307 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
13 By November 1974, the Federal Reserve Board reported that total consumer credit,
excluding home mortgages, totalled $188,084,000,000. It was distributed as follows,
rounded to the nearest tenth billion:
Installment Credit
Automobile paper
Other consumer goods
Home Improvements
Personal loans

$52.3
50.4
8.3
44.2

Non-Installment Credit
Single-payment loans
Charge accounts
Service credit

$13.0
9.3
10.7

In terms of the shares of this credit held by various types of lenders, commercial banks
held consumer obligations totalling $84.4 billion, finance companies $38.8 billion, retail
outlets $18.3 billion, and other financial lenders, such as credit unions, savings and loan
associations, and so forth, $25.2 billion. 61 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 47-48 (Jan. 1975).
The 1974 total of $188 billion of outstanding consumer credit obligations reflects more
than a doubling of such credit in the nine years since 1965. To appreciate further the rate of
growth, note that this total was $21.5 billion in 1950 and a mere $9.2 billion in 1941. 58 FED.
RESERVE BULL. A 56 (May 1972).
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A. Consumer FinancingPatterns
For analytical purposes, the financing patterns which give rise
to holder in due course claims can be categorized-but one must be
aware that there are no clear delineations between them and that
the patterns may overlap. Nor are they frozen into stereotyped
forms . 4 Certainly the credit industry has not exhausted the ingenuity that produced these techniques, and it is to be expected
that creditors will continue to seek new ways to protect themselves
from consumer defenses.
1. Notes
In many transactions, the consumer is asked to execute a
negotiable promissory note separate, or separable, from the underlying sale agreement. This note, with any accompanying mortgage
or security instrument, is then sold ("negotiated") to a bank,
finance company, or similar third party. The legal rules here are
old and straightforward. If the holder takes the instrument for
value,' 5 in good faith,' 6 and without notice,' 7 he has taken "in due
course" and can claim the special protections of holder in due
course status.' 8 The note is also deemed to "impart negotiability" to
14 One of the most striking shifts in purchasing patterns is the rapidly increasing use of
bank credit cards. The amount of such credit jumped from $1.3 billion in 1968 to $7.9
billion by November 1974. 61 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 47 (Jan. 1975). It has been ably argued
that credit card transactions are not really credit transactions at all in many cases, and that
even if they are they involve neither negotiable notes nor assignments of consumer
obligations from merchant to issuer in the classic sense. Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge
Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1971).
Banks in particular continue to blur the lines of traditional financing patterns through
check credit loans incident to credit card plans and overdraft privileges for regular checking
accounts. A bank in the District of Columbia has advertised a "Gold Key Auto Charge Card"
by which the bank commits itself in advance to make an auto loan to approved customers who
may then simply select their purchase from any of 80 participating dealers. The bank then
requires the dealer to assign the executed contracts. See National Bank of Washington,
Buying A Car Is As Easy As Saying "Charge it," 1973 (brochure distributed to customers).
In the related area of farm credit, a midwest bank has begun offering what it calls "Ag
Reserve" plans which amount to an open line of credit for farmers, avoiding the need for a
series of separate loans, separately secured. Douglas, Ag Reserve: Welcomed Aid to Farm
Financing 58 BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE 22 (June 1974).
15 UCC § 3-303.
16 Id. §§ 1-201(I9), 3-302(1)(b).
17 Id. § 3-304.
18 Id. § 3-305. The operative language protects the holder in due course from "(1) all
claims to it on the part of any person; and (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument
with whom the holder has not dealt." The balance of the provision excepts five specified
"real" defenses which therefore remain available even against a holder in due course. Id.
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the collateral security agreement, i 9 so that the holder can foreclose
the security free of defenses as well.
There does not seem to be any discernible pattern to the use
of notes as opposed to contractual waiver clauses. Promissory notes
commonly appear in home-improvement cases, automobile installment sales, and other hard-goods financing.

2. Waiver of Defense Clauses
Alternatively, or at times in addition, to using a negotiable
note, the form contract signed by the consumer may contain a
simple clause 20 by which the consumer agrees to assert any claim or
defense only against the merchant-seller and not against any assignee. Despite some early reluctance on the part of courts to give
effect to these clauses, 21 they have become commonplace in consumer credit transactions and their effect is to insulate the creditor
from most claims and defenses by virtue of contract terms rather
than by formal application of the law of negotiable instruments.
The Uniform Commercial Code supports the validity of such
clauses generally in commercial agreements, "[s]ubject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, 22 and subject also to those more
serious, or "real," defenses 2 3 that would be assertable even against
a holder in due course.
Where permitted, these clauses are boilerplate inclusions in
19 Bautista & Kennedy, The Imputed Negotiability of Security Interests Under the Code, 38
INDIANA L.J. 574 (1963); cf. UCC § 9-206(l).
20 One clause, from the contract involved in Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d
228 (D.C. App. 1972), reads:
Buyer understands and agrees that Buyer will settle directly with the Original
Seller all claims, setoffs, counterclaims and other defenses there may be against the
Original Seller and that Buyer shall not setup any such claim, setoff, counterdaim
or other defense against any such subsequent holder.
Id. at 230. A standard form book recommends simpler language: "The buyer hereby waives
as against any assignee of this contract any claim or defense which he may have against the
seller." R. ANDERSON,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, LEGAL FORMS, Form 9:182, at 886

(1963).
21 When waiver of defense dauses first appeared in consumer conditional sales contracts, some courts struck them down as attempts to impart negotiability by contract. Cf.
Gilmore, supra note I, at 1095-96. This reasoning appears occasionally in contemporary
judidal opinions as an alternative ground for denying financers protection. See Fairfield
Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 550, 264 A.2d 547, 550 {1969); Unico v. Owen, 50
N.J. 101, 124, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967); Discount Purchasing Co. v. Porch, 12 UCC REP.
SERV. 600, 608 (Tenn. App. 1973).
22 UCC § 9-206.
23 See notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
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every consumer contract which contemplates transfer to a third
party financer. A particular bone of contention has been their use
in the agreements between credit card holders and issuers to
disable the consumer from, in effect, stopping payment for defec24
tive goods or services purchased with the card.
3. Interlocking Loans
A consumer is theoretically always free to borrow cash from an
independent lender-bank, credit union, loan company-and use
that money to pay cash for goods or services. In such a two-step
transaction the consumer has no legal basis for refusing to repay
the loan if he is dissatisfied with his purchase: the loan and the
purchase are in fact and in law separate agreements. But there is
evidence that it is becoming increasingly common for a merchantseller to develop a working arrangement with an independent
lender whereby customers desiring credit are referred to a particular lender-or lenders, if the customer needs to borrow the
downpayment separately from the balance-for cash loans which
are paid directly to the merchant-seller. The "interlock" between
seller and lender can take many forms: common ownership, formal
agreement, long course of dealing, the lender's providing loan
applications to the seller who assists customers in procuring the
loan, free transportation from the seller's place of business tQ the
lender's, and so on. The net effect is that the lender is financing
retail sales, but in a format which appears to leave him beyond the
reach of the customer's defenses from the sale part of the transac25
tion.
Examples of such ostensibly independent loan-sale transactions range from one reported instance where a door-to-door
salesman had a loan company official riding with him on his
rounds2 6 to the increasingly common check-credit plans offered by
many banks where the consumer "borrows" from the bank by
writing overdraft checks on his regular checking account.
4. Credit Cards
The entry of banks into the revolving credit business in the
early 1960's, and the proliferation of multi-purpose credit card
24 See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.

21 See generally Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272 (1969).
2" This story has been recounted third-hand. Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer Act:
Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 366 n.107.
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plans like Carte Blanche and American Express, have created
gargantuan regulatory problems in the space of less than a decade.2 7 One of those problems is whether consumers ought to be
able to assert defenses arising from the underlying transaction
against the card issuer. Without conceding that they are "assignees"
of the merchant's contract claim against the consumer cardholder,2 8 the card issuers have nonetheless regularly included
waiver of defense clauses in their cardholder agreements. The one
major lawsuit that would have presented the question of the
validity of these clauses for judicial review aborted before the
29
question could be reached.
There is, of course, no difficulty with the revolving- charge
account operated by the merchant himself. Sears, Montgomery
Ward, and J.C. Penney, for example, are clearly subject to their
own customers' product defenses. The troublesome patterns are
the nationwide or regional multiparty card plans, where the local
bank which has issued the card may have no contact with or control
over the merchant half a continent away from whom the cardholder buys defective goods, and where the card issuer appears to
have committed a line of credit to its customer without any idea of,
or control over, what the customer may purchase with it.
5. Cognate Arrangements
While the above-described techniques are expressly designed
to cut off consumer defenses, there are any number of other ways
for the creditor to produce virtually the same effect. One of
these-which is partially contractual and partially evidentiary-is
the insistence by third party creditors on "completion certificates"
from consumers before purchasing their obligations.3 0 When the
27 See Webster, Bank Charge Cards-Recent Developments in Regulation and Operation, 26
Bus. LAw. 43 (1970); Weistart, Consumer Protectio.n in the Credit Card Industry: Federal
Legislative Controls, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1475 (1972).
28 See American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n &
National BankAmericard, Inc., Statement and Renewed Petition, March 5, 1973, in FTC
Record and Transcript of Hearings on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, FTC Docket No.
215-31-1, at 6909 (Jan. 26, 1971).
29 Payne v. United Cal. Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972). The
court determined that the suit was not properly maintained as a class action and so never
reached the merits of the holder in due course issue. Id. at 859, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
30 Such certificates were instrumental in protecting the financers in Sullivan v. United
Dealers Corp., 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972), and Fuller v. American Aluminum Corp., 249
So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1971). By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court has cited the financer's
failure to insist on a completion certificate as part of its rationale for denying holder in due
course protection. General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 401, 278 A.2d 193, 195
(1971).
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consumer claims the aluminum siding was shoddy or never completely installed, the creditor brandishes the certificate and in effect
asserts an estoppel against the consumer as to defenses relating to
the adequacy or completeness of the seller's performance. Another
is the use of cognovit notes, confession of judgment clauses, or
wage assignments. Where permitted, 3 1 these devices enable the
creditor upon default to reduce his claim to judgment immediately
or to begin immediate payroll deductions. If the consumer is to
assert his claim he must reopen that judgment or revoke the
assignment through whatever procedure the jurisdiction provides.
Similarly, the secured creditor who repossesses collateral from a
consumer debtor-particularly if he repossesses by self-help without recourse to judicial process 3 2-effectively deprives the debtor
of a chance to assert his defenses unless that consumer takes the
litigation initiative.
To these can be added the myriad procedural devices which
either intentionally or accidentally deny the consumer debtor a
reasonable opportunity to litigate or negotiate his claim: sewer
service of process, inconvenient venue, lack of access to legal
counsel, sheer ignorance of the judicial process-all those things
that produce the high ratio of default judgments3 3 in consumer
cases. Still further, but more remotely, an intransigent creditor
attitude, harassing collection efforts, threats of destroying credit
ratings, or threats of employment discharge all work to undermine
31 Only a nandful of states permit confession of judgment clauses in consumer obligations. NCCF REPORT 26. Such clauses did, however, survive a charge that they were per se
unconstitutional in recent companion cases in the Supreme Court. D. H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). The Swarb decision
involved a consumer obligation, and the Court acknowledged that entry of judgment
pursuant to the clause could be unconstitutional if consent to it by the consumer was not a
knowing and voluntary one, supported by consideration and not otherwise unconscionable.
405 U.S. at 201. Wage assignments have been found not to involve state action at all and
thus not to be challengeable on due process grounds. Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 65 (1974). Proposed uniform laws would flatly prohibit such
arrangements. 1974 UCCC §§ 3.305-.306; NCA §§ 2.403-.404; MCCA §§ 2.405-.409; see
1969 UCCC §§ 2.410,-.415, 3.403,-.407.
32 Self-help repossession, if it can be done without a breach of the peace, is valid. UCC
§ 9-503. Due process challenges to this tactic have been repeatedly beaten back. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325
(1974).
33 For an excellent empirical analysis of consumer defaultjudgments see Note, Resort to
the Legal Process in Collecting Debts From High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative
Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 879 (1967). See also Clark, Default,
Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to -the Underworld and a ProposedSalvation, 51
ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972).
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the consumer's right
to assert defenses and claims from the under34
lying transaction.

6. Consumer "Claims and Defense"
With this arsenal of protective devices facing the consumer, it
is worth describing briefly the different kinds of legal claims or
defenses the consumer may want to assert.
Initially, there is that group of defenses which are so serious
that the law has traditionally permitted the obligor to assert them
even against an innocent purchaser for value of the obligation.
These are the so-called real defenses: 3 5 illegal contract, incapacity
to contract, duress, infancy, "fraud in the factum," and insolvency
discharge. The thrust of these defenses is that they negate the very
obligation sought to be enforced either because a basic requisite of
a binding contract is lacking, or in order to effectuate public
policies of a higher order than merely maintaining the marketability of commercial paper. 36 Case law on these defenses in consumer
transactions is scant, 37 and what there is arises in the context of
negotiable notes; there is no judicial opinion on the effectiveness of
a waiver clause to avoid these defenses. The reason undoubtedly is
that since the claimed defense vitiates the obligation entirely no
waiver of rights within that same obligation can survive. The
" See generally Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the
Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1972); Halloran, Collection Practices (Garnishment,Deficiency
Judgments, Etc.), 26 Bus. LAw. 889 (1971).
The seller may also try to cut off consumer claims and defenses at the threshold, by
disclaiming warranty and other obligations in the original contract. See Dugan, Severance of
Buyer's Defenses Against the Seller's Assignee Through Merger-DisclaimerClauses: Circumvention of
UCCC Sections 2.403 and 2.404, 19 VILL. L. REv. 555 (1974).
35 These "real" defenses have been defined to be:
(a) infancy, to the extent it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the
obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its
essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the instrument.
UCC § 3-305(2).
36 W. BRrrrON, supra note 12, at 332.
37 Qgnsumers prevailed on "real" defenses in Universal Acceptance Corp. v. Burks, 7
UCC REP. SER. 39 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969), and American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio
App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). Consumers lost, however, in Moore v. Southern Discount
Co., 107 Ga. App. 868, 132 S.E.2d 101 (1964), Burchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 74
N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964), and Reading Trust Co. v. Hutchinson, 35 Pa. D. & C. 2d 790
(C.P. 1964).
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Uniform Commercial Code confirms that a waiver clause is not
effective "as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. '38 But, curiously,
there was no similar language in the original Uniform Consumer
Credit Code provision which validated a limited waiver agreement.3 9
Another large grouping of consumer defenses are those
characterized as personal defenses, which are effective only against
the merchant-seller. 40 In the case of a negotiable note, these would
include the fact that the consumer had never delivered the instrument to the creditor, or that delivery was conditional and the
condition had not been satisfied. For example, an automobile
purchaser might execute a note on the understanding that it would
be cancelled if he could not obtain liability insurance coverage.
Should this note be negotiated on to an innocent third party he
could enforce it free of the consumer's claim of conditional delivery. The many kinds of fraud in the inducement are also mere
personal defenses. Here the consumer's position is that he was
persuaded to execute the obligation by deception, misrepresentation, or other trickery not amounting to the more egregious real
defense of fraud in the factumn. High pressure sales tactics, knowingly false product claims, and nondisclosure of material information are examples. Exorbitant prices and other oppressive contract
terms which may be held unconscionable under contemporary case
law41 are also probably only personal defenses, 4 2 lost against a
holder in due course.
Most consumer claims and defenses, however, are usually
related to the goods or services that were the subject of the
38 UCC § 9-206(1).
39 1969 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B.
40 A person who does not have the rights of a holder in due course takes the instrument
subject to, inter alia,
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple contract;
and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, nonperformance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose ....

UCC § 3-306(b), (c).
41 Cf Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Toker
v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
42 Neither court nor commentator has addressed the question whether unconscionability is a real or a personal defense. A hornbook lists unconscionability among personal
defenses (see J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 487), but another commentator has
suggested without elaboration that "if a contract is unconscionable under [UCCI section
2-302 an obligation based on it may be a 'nullity'," for UCC § 3-305 purposes. Countryman,
supra note 6, at 6.
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transaction. The furniture is never delivered, or only part of it
arrives; the health spa goes out of business halfway through the
membership term; the home improvement contractor never
finishes the installation or he fails to clean up his debris; the used
car transmission falls out; the new automobile spends more time in
the repair shop than on the road-all of these examples are,
unfortunately, familiar. These facts can generate legal claims
under various theories: fraud, failure of consideration, breach of
warranty, breach of contract, negligence. Whatever the legal
ground, these product-based claims frustrate and anger consumers
and justifiably lead to withheld payments, defaults, unsuccessful
attempts to rescind, and ultimately to the creditor's assertion that
he is a holder in due course and entitled to collect notwithstanding
the consumer's legitimate complaint against his seller.
Beyond these are an increasing battery of statutory claims
consumers may assert against sellers and hence, arguably, against
assignees or other third parties who hold consumer obligations.
Recovery of usurious interest is one example. 43 Several proposed
uniform acts authorize consumers to recover either damages
caused by statutory violations or civil penalties unrelated to actual
damages. For instance, the 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code
authorizes recovery of penalties and specifies that the liability runs
to "an assignee.., who undertakes direct collection of payments or
enforcement of rights arising from the debt. '4 4 The Uniform
Consumer Sales Practices Act 45 similarly permits recovery of a
minimum of one hundred dollars by a consumer who is damaged
by a violation of that Act's proscriptions against deceptive and
unconscionable practices. In both cases attorney's fees are also
46
recoverable.
Both the 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code47 and the
federal Truth in Lending Act 48 provide for civil penalties from one
hundred to one thousand dollars for disclosure violations, and
both laws recognize that in some instances these claims can be
43 Penalties for usury vary across the nation, ranging from forfeitures of only the excess
amount to forfeiture of all interest, to a recovery of treble the amount of interest charged, to
a voiding of the entire obligation. See Winter & Hirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli, 122 Ill.
App. 2d
372, 259 N.E.2d 312 (1970).
44 1969 UCCC § 5.202(1). Similar language appears in the following two subsections,
dealing with recovery of payments from unlicensed lenders and recovery of excess charges.
See text accompanying notes 267-75 infra.
45 UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcrIcEs AcT § lI(a).
4r 1969 UCCC § 5.202(8); UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 11(c).
47 1969 UCCC § 5.203(1).
48 Truth in Lending Act § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
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pressed against third party financers. 4 9 Together these statutes
constitute a significant effort to strengthen the consumer's hand in
policing against unlawful practices; at the same time they represent
substantial potential liabilities for financers if holder in due course
protection cannot be invoked.
The common feature of the various categories of consumer
claims and defenses is that they arise in the first instance in the
dealer-consumer transaction. They are all obviously assertable
against that merchant if he can be found and if he is solvent. The
susceptibility of the third party financer to these claims and defenses is derivative or indirect. This has been the traditional meaning of holder in due course-the insulation of the financer from
vicarious liability. But there is now some evidence that in appropriate cases courts may consider the financer directly liable for his
own conduct. Whether cast in terms of the financer's obligation to
exercise due care, 50 or his fiduciary responsibility,5 1 or his duty to
avoid defamation of title, 2 the prospect of direct creditor liability
adds another significant dimension to the geometry of the holder
in due course notion.
As one final observation, it is worth noting that until very
recently the universal assumption seems to have been that the most
any obligor could hope to achieve by challenging an alleged holder
in due course was that, if the challenge succeeded, the creditor's
recovery on the principal balance would be diminished or cancelled. It has apparently been unspeakable to suggest that a
consumer-or any other debtor, for that matter-might be entitled
to an affirmative recovery against the financer over and above any
balance then outstanding. Thus, in any enumeration of the kinds
of consumer claims and defenses that would be retained if holder
in due course is abolished, a subliminal question is the extent of the
49 1969 UCCC § 5.203(4); Truth in Lending Act §§ 130(d), 131, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(d),
1641 (1970).

50 Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.

369 (1968).
5' Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973). The
court did not explicate a fiduciary responsibility in so many words, but it is implicit in the
opinion. The financer, Jefferson, had made first trust loans directly to consumer purchasers,
rather than purchasing notes from others. The case is therefore a version of the interlocking
loan pattern described above. It is now on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Civil No. 74-1179 (D.C. Cir., filed Jan. 28, 1974).
52 Paulson v. Kustom Enterprises, Inc., 157 Mont. 188,483 P.2d 708 (1971). On review
of a summary judgment, the court agreed that the third party financer might be liable for
"slander to title" to the consumer's home, which was mortgaged to the seller of defective
carpeting. This writer understands from plaintiff's counsel that the case was then settled on
the basis of a substantial payment from defendant-financer to plaintiff-consumers.
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resulting liability. Can, or should, the financer ever be subject to
suit or counterclaim for amounts beyond the contract balance? The
answer, it is submitted, is quite unclear despite the fact that most
proposals for statutory modification of holder in due course would
restrict the financer's exposure to the amount owing at the time he
53
learns of the claim or defense.
B.

The Death Watch

Since holder in due course was originally a judicially created
doctrine, it is not surprising that it has been the courts which have
led the assault on its use in coniumer transactions. Their attacks
over at least thirty-five years54 have taken many forms, but the
common rationale has been that a financer who works closely with
a seller does not merit insulation from consumer defenses. In
terms of risk allocation policy, courts have said, the financer is in a
better position than the consumer to bear or distribute losses. 55 It
was argued that policies favoring the free marketability of commercial paper were inapplicable in the consumer area because
course protection to
creditors simply did not need holder in due
56
financing.
consumer
in
profitably
engage
Aside from doctrinal analysis, the human effects of permitting
holder in due course protection were found intolerable, particularly for the poor and the uneducated, who were most likely to be
victimized by deceptive sales practices, shoddy goods, and inept
services. Loud voices were raised that holder in due course ought

" See text accompanying notes 217-41 infra. The new UCCC adopts that limitation in
provisions dealing with assignees, credit card issuers, and interlocking lenders. 1974 UCCC
§§ 3.403(3)(d), -.404(2), -.405(2). Compare FCBA § 170(b).
54 The watershed case is Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137
S.W.2d 260 (1940).
55 One court put it tbis way:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in business methods
and will impose a greater burden on the finance companies. We think the
buyer-Mr. & Mrs. General Public-should have some protection somewhere along
the line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk of the
dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect his interests
against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.
Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
56 Professor Kripke argues forcefully that there is no cutoff of defenses in the financing
of commercial accounts receivable because the contracts giving rise to the accounts are not
contracts of adhesion and the commercial buyers-obligors simply would not tolerate efforts
to include cutoff terms in those contracts. The commercial financer therefore studies
carefully the operations and experience of the seller-assignor and refuses to do business with
unreliable merchants. Thus, accounts receivable financing flourishes without concern about
cutting off defenses and, says Kripke, "[tihe same type of credit thinking would provide the
answer in the consumer field." Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-OrientedViewpoint, 68 COLuM. L. REv. 445, 472 (1968).
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to be abolished outright in consumer transactions, and several state
legislatures had moved in that direction by the early 1960's. 5 7 The
case law rejecting holder in due course reached a high-water mark
when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Unico v. Owen 58 in
1967. And when the 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code fencestraddled the issue, consumer spokesmen launched vehement attacks on the document. 59
Holder in due course was described as "hard... to explain, 60
an "anachronism," 6' and "effectively dead. '62 In 1972, the prestigious National Commission on Consumer Finance recommended
its abolition, 63 and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has now promulgated the 1974 Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, which would largely accomplish that recommendation. Much of the case law since Unico has continued the
assault typified in that case. 64 Under this kind of pressure, and with
almost no countering voices 65 in its defense, holder in due course
should have succumbed quietly. But, as the following sections
show, it refuses to go away. The same writer who in 1969 declared
it "effectively dead" 66 was writing in 1974 of the "continuing
demise" 67 of the doctrine, apparently without appreciating what a

"

See generally B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 108 (1965). In
1961, Massachusetts was the first state to enact a broad prohibition against holder in due
course, requiring that all consumer obligations carry a legend identifying them as "consumer
notes" which are non-negotiable. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12C (1968); id. ch.
255B, § 19A; id. ch. 255D, § 25A.
58 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); see note 2 supra.
59 For a collection of papers criticizing the 1969 UCCC see CONSUMER RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, CONSUMER VIEWPOINTS: CRITIQUE OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

(1971). Of particular interest are the appraisals of proposed § 2.404 by Benny L. Kass (id. at
313), the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (id. at 231), the New York City
Consumers' Advisory Council (id. at 339-43), Neil 0. Littlefield & William R. Breetz, Jr. (id.
at 360-62), Berlin, Roisman & Kessler-counsel to the Consumer Federation of America (id.
at 443-46), and Judge George Brunn (id. at 525-26).
60 Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1098.
61 Countryman, supra note 6, at 1.
62 Littlefield, supra note 25, at 292.
63 NCCF REPORT 34-38.
64 See cases cited note 68 infra.
65 Defenders of holder in due course show up at legislative hearings, but rarely
elsewhere in public. One recent article, itself based on testimony before the FTC, appeared
to defend the doctrine, but in fact was mosdy a challenge to the jurisdiction of the FTC to
promulgate a trade regulation rule on the subject. McNeill, The Necessity of Retaining the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 UCC L.J. 149 (1972).
66 Littlefield, supra note 25, at 292.
67 Littlefield, The ContinuingDemise of the Holder in Due Course Concept, 79 COM. L.J. 41
(1974). See also Erickson, Demise of Holder in Due Course, Waiver of Defense, and Interlocking
Loan Lender Defenses in Consumer Transactions, 15 S. TEXAS L.J. 236 (1974).
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lengthy death watch he was conducting. The thought begins to
gnaw that obituaries may be premature and that perhaps the
all-out nature of the assault has been disguising some deeper
complexities in the three-cornered relationship among consumer,
merchant, and the financer of their transactions.
C. Judicial Resurgence
Although the overall judicial attitude toward holder in due
course is clearly unsympathetic, 6 8 the movement against the doctrine continues to be sporadic and uneven. Where anti-holder-indue-course sentiment is strong, courts have not hestitated to reflect
it in their opinions. For example, the New York Appellate Division
recently approved sweeping discovery into a finance company's
corporate structure and business practices in support of a consumer's close-connectedness challenge to his financer's holder in
due course status. 69 A Massachusetts court was quite willing to
preserve a debtor's defenses against a home improvement financer
who inadvertently captioned his form "Consumer Note," even
though the court agreed that the transaction was technically one
for services and not subject to the statutory ban against holder in
70
due course.
On the other hand, in some states-particularly in the
south-courts have ignored the war on holder in due course being
waged elsewhere, and continue to recognize it in its traditional
form. 7 1 In other states, the courts simply have not dealt with the
" The most recent cases reflecting a broad policy bias against holder in due course in
consumer transactions include: Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971); Gross v. Appelgren, 467 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1970); Fairfield Credit Corp.
v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256
A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972);
Kennard v. Reliance, Inc., 264 A.2d 832 (Md. 1970); General Inv. Co. v. Angelini, 58 N.J.
396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971); Discount Purchasing Co. v. Porch, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 600 (Tenn.
App. 1973).
" Avco Sec. Corp. v. Post, 42 App. Div. 2d 395, 348 N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Dep't 1973).
70 Alcoa Credit Co. v. Nickerson, 43 Mass. App. 1 (1968).
71 In some cases the creditor successfully took shelter behind his holder in due course
claim. Cook v. Southern Credit Co., 247 Ark. 981, 448 S.W.2d 634 (1970); Westinghouse
Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973); Steelman v. Associated
Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62 (1970); General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Jett, 231 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1970); Ford Motors Credit Corp. v. Williams, 225 So. 2d
717 (La. App. 1969); Securities Inv. Co. v. Guillotte, 223 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1969);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carter, 218 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 1969); Fuller v. American
Aluminum Corp., 249 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1971).
Other decisions denied the financer the status of holder in due course, but did so by
applying the traditional formulae without a glimmer of special concern for the consumer
litigants. United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 285 Ala. 105, 229 So. 2d 495 (1969); Tri-D
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issue. In still others, there have been in the past two or three years
some unexpected holdings from the highest courts in the jurisdictions that reaffirm the protected status of consumer financers.
Each of these latter cases is somewhat curious on its facts; each is
easily criticized on its merits; none can be read as a total repudiation of anti-holder-in-due-course policy in the jurisdiction. But
together they suggest that the case against the doctrine has not
been made persuasively in appellate tribunals, or at least that there
are some judges who find the doctrine to be acceptable consumer
policy on certain facts.
72
In one of these cases, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld a waiver of defense clause in a consumer's automobile
purchase contract against an argument that the Unico rationale7 3
should be applied to invalidate it. It found arm's-length dealing
between seller and bank on the record in that case, despite the fact
that a few years earlier the same court had ruled that a close
relationship between seller and financer deprived a lending agency
of the protections accorded a holder in due course.7 4 The case at
bar was unique in that the "defense" asserted was not a defect in
the car sold, but the failure of*the dealer to pay off a prior lien on
the traded-in automobile. Still, the judicial attitude seems to be a
clear retreat from an earlier position and is at odds with prospective legislative policy in the state-a Minnesota statute, not yet
effective at the time of the subject transaction, flatly bars waiver of
75
defense clauses in consumer credit sales.
Another retreat from an earlier holding occurred in Kentucky
.in 1972. The Court of Appeals sustained the holder in due course
Acceptance Corp. v. Scruggs, 223 So. 2d 273 (Ala. 1969); Motors Ins. Co. v. Isadore, 227 So.
2d 651 (La. App. 1969); SFC Acceptance Corp. v. Spain, 251 La. 902, 207 So. 2d 364 (1968);
Nationwide Acceptance Corp. v. Henne, 194 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 1967).
Perhaps because the judicial attitudes reflected in these cases were so unimaginative, the
legislatures in several of these states have since enacted legislation limiting or banning cutoff
devices. See ALA. CODE tit. 5, §§ 319(a), 320(a) (Supp. 1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3532
(Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 96-908(b) (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8075-13(i) (Supp.
1972).
712Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 214 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1973).
73 See note 2 supra.
74 The earlier case was International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d
172 (1965), which did not involve a consumer debtor in the strict sense. Rieger purchased
four drydeaning machines for his business, executing a note for $24,190. The dealer
apparently forged Rieger's name to a certificate attesting that the machines were acceptable,
when in fact they were not. The court denied holder in due course status to the financer on
evidence that it supplied contract forms to the dealer and insisted on certificates of
satisfaction before it hought the notes at a substantial discount.

75 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.94(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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claim of a finance company which purchased a consumer's note
76
and mortgage from the seller of a defective prefabricated home.
Although the financer had done five hundred thousand dollars'
worth of business with the seller since 1951, and although the
financer knew that construction had not begun when it took the
instruments, it did not have notice of anything except that there
might be defenses. This, said the court, was not enough to deny
holder in due course protection. But, as in Minnesota, there was
earlier case law from the same court citing a close business association as grounds for stripping protection from an otherwise independent financer.7 7 The later decision seems to back off from that
position.
From Vermont, too, has come a surprising analysis of holder
in due course, in a case which, although admittedly unusual,
seemed clearly to call for consumer protection. In Randolph National Bank v. Vail,7 8 the consumer debtor contracted for the
construction of a home. After construction was begun, the contractors sought a loan from the bank, which the bank agreed to make if
the homeowner would execute a promissory note payable to the
contractors which would then be indorsed to the bank. This Mr.
Vail did, only to find that construction was never completed and
the bank was demanding full payment. The Vermont court approved entry of summary judgment for the bank, and its opinion
explicitly rejected a "close connectedness" argument urged by the
defendant consumer. In the court's view, this was purely a "onetime encounter" between the bank and the contractors and the
lender could not be considered the "moving force" behind the
7 9
transaction even though it had insisted on having Vail's note.
What makes the case startling, however, is the fact that there was in
effect in Vermont a statute which appeared to deny holder in due
course status across the board in consumer transactions.8" The
76 Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp., 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972).
77 In Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969), the plaintiff manufac-

turer had purchased back from the retail dealer the installment sales contract executed by
defendant Utley in connection with the purchase of allegedly defective farm equipment.
This kind of manufacturer financing is apparently common in that market. The court noted
that the manufacturer could be considered the "real vendor" in the transaction, since its
representatives assisted the retail seller in making sales and it regularly supplied the dealer

with blank contract forms which were routinely assigned as soon as sales were made.
78 131 Vt. 390, 808 A.2d 588 (1973).
79 Id. at 394-95, 308 A.2d at 590-91..
so The statute stated:
The holder of a promissory note or instrument or other evidence of indebtedness of a consumer delivered in connection with a contract shall take or hold that
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court took the incredibly narrow position that since Vail executed
the note after the construction agreement the note was not "delivered in connection with a contract" as the statute required . 8 The
decision thus clearly frustrates one of the most sweeping antiholder-in-due-course statutes yet enacted, and raises ominous questions about how other such legislation will fare in the hands of
tradition-minded courts.
The strangest and most troublesome of these resurgent cases is
Block v. Ford Motor Credit Company.82 The creditor sued in the
District of Columbia for the balance owing on a Ford automobile
purchased by Block in Baltimore, Maryland. The parties agreed
that Maryland law controlled, but the court ruled that even though
Maryland adhered to the "close connectedness" doctrine there was
no evidence here of the requisite closeness between Ford's
affiliated finance company and its franchised Ford dealer.8 3 The
court spelled out the factual bases for this conclusion, among which
were the lack of any joint management of the dealer and the
creditor, the absence of any formal discounting agreement between
them, and a high rejection rate for contracts offered to the
financer. On the other hand, the financer had acquired about
2,500 contracts per year from the dealer, supplied the sales contract forms used by him, allowed its name to be used for advertising purposes at the seller's place of business, and was aware of
other customer complaints. 84 While the District of Columbia court
might have felt reluctant in this choice-of-law context to essay
interpolations of Maryland law, it hardly did justice to the Maryland precedent cited.8 5 Ultimately the case may be explainable only
note, instrument or evidence subject to all defenses of such consumer which would
be available to the consumer in an action on a simple contract ....
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1971).
Despite the surface simplicity of this language, difficulties in applying it to interlocking
loans have been noted. Littlefield, supra note 6, at 490-91.
81 131 Vt. at 393, 308 A.2d at 590.
82 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. App. 1972).
83 1d. at 232-33.
84 Id. at 233.

85 The court in Block acknowledged that Maryland recognizes the "Close connectedness
doctrine," citing Kennard v. Reliance, Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (1970). In the latter
case, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that where state law forbade the taking of
negotiable notes in consumer transactions, a finance company could not be a holder in due
course if it purchased such a note with knowledge that it arose from a consumer installment
sale. Remanding the case for further proceedings, the court then instructed the trial judge
to consider separately whether the financer knew this was a forbidden note, and "whether
the relationship between Reliance [the financer] and Meadowbrook [the seller] was so close
as to make Reliance not a holder in due course." Id. at 665, 264 A.2d at 837. The court thus
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by its relative lily-whiteness: Block was a business executive with a
doctorate degree; the seller was still in business and apparently
solvent; there had been no other litigation in the past five years
involving the finance company and customers of the dealer.
Although these cases are a minority even among recent holder
in due course decisions, they distinctly brake the trend of case law
in jurisdictions which had begun to discard holder in due course.
They therefore raise the question why they were decided as they
were. Why wasn't the court in each instance persuaded either to
extend prior case law or to reinforce legislative policy in the state?
Why were these courts hesitant to join the funeral cortege, when
they clearly had the option to do so? The only easy answer is that
they felt it unwise or injudicious to declare that holder in due
course had outlived its usefulness.
D. Legislative Developments and Impasses
While the courts continue to struggle with holder in due
course cases, a number of legislatures have attempted to deal with
the issue by statute. As with case law, there has been distinct
movement toward legislation prohibiting, or severely restricting,
holder in due course in its many forms in consumer credit transactions.86 The legislative approach, of course, is the "clean" one,
for it avoids the vagaries of judicial opinions, provides a basis
for uniform practices, and permits comprehensive data-gathering
beyond the confines of a single dispute. But the sum of these
activities is hardly an unequivocal consensus on what the problems
are or how statutes should deal with them.
There is but one pertinent federal statute,87 and that is limited
to credit cards. Controversial provisions and proposals are discussed throughout the balance of this Article, and it will suffice at
this point simply to appreciate the disparity of legislative efforts,
and their current status.
not only approved the close connectedness theory but expressly left the matter open for fact
findings on retrial. The District of Columbia court in Block, on the other hand, affirmed a
summary judgment for the creditor despite substantial evidence of dealer-financer involvement. 286 A.2d at 233.
See also Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967).
86 A catalog of the enactments in the various states has been made elsewhere and will
not be repeated here. A compilation prepared by the National Consumer Law Center is
incorporated into an article by the Center's first director. Willier, supra note 3. The NCLC
study is also excerpted as the fourth and fifth appendices to another article. Crandall, supra
note 26, at 386.
87 FCBA § 170 (1974).
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1. The State Statutes

Compilations show that as of 1972 some thirty-four jurisdictions had modified holder in due course by banning or limiting the
use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions,8 8 while
89
thirty-seven jurisdictions had dealt with waiver of defense clauses.
A few states have added provisions since that date.90 There is little
unanimity, however, within these groups. Some prohibit the use of
negotiable notes in consumer transactions but leave unimpaired
the rights of a person who takes such a note without knowledge
that it is in violation of the statute; 91 others require legends on the
instruments themselves indicating their origin in a consumer transaction. 92 The ban on negotiability is sometimes applicable to all
consumer transactions, 93 and sometimes only to home solicitation
sales, 94 or home improvements, 95 motor vehicle sales, 96 or consumer goods and services other than motor vehicles. 97 A handful
of jurisdictions give the consumer a limited period of timeranging from five to ninety days 98-within which he can assert
defenses but after which the creditor is insulated.
For waiver of defense clauses, the same array of variations
exists. Some states bar such clauses altogether, 99 others contain
88

For a discussion of these statutes see Crandall, supra note 26, at 387-93.

89 For a discussion of these latter statutes see id. at 394-99.

90 Within the past two years, seven states--Iowa, Maine, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia-have enacted their first anti-holder-in-duecourse statutes. No. 1405, [1974] Iowa Laws (2 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, IOWA
5193-95 (1974)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 3.403-.404 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Ch. 390,
§ 5, [1973] N.D. Laws 1108; No. 2356 [1974] S.C. Laws (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE,
S.C. 9 5103-04 (1974)); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 57-IOA (Supp. 1974); No. 240, [1974]
W. Va. Laws (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, W. VA. 9 5031-33 (1974)). Several other
jurisdictions have significantly added to prior legislation. It now appears that only Arkansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Virginia have no statutes other
than the UCC "on holder in due course. For synopses of the legislation in the states see
generally CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
4380, 4390 (1969).
91 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3807 (1973); 1969 UCCC § 2.403.
92 E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.820 (1971).
91 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 422.406(1) (1974).
91 E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 320:2I-a (Supp. 1973).
95 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.74(7) (1972).
96 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615.G (1965).
97 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.416(II5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
98 Illinois, for example, gives the consumer five days from the delivery of goods to
notify the creditor of his defenses (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262D (Smith-Hurd Cum.
Supp. 1974)), while Colorado deems a note negotiable 90 days from its date. COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 73-2-403() (Cum. Supp. 1971).
99 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 320(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973).

1975]

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

time-notice provisions; 100 some retain all consumer defenses,' 0 '
others retain only an enumerated few.' 0 2 The scope of these
statutes may run to all consumer goods or services, or may be
limited to specific transactions.
Only a few jurisdictions10 3 have dealt with the interlocking
loan pattern; although they generally agree that consumers ought
to retain defenses against lenders who act in concert with retail
dealers, there is little consistency in the specific statutory criteria by
which this policy is implemented. Another handful of states have
legislated specifically with respect to credit card transactions,' 0 4 but
here too there is disparity of trdatment.
One might hope that the crazy-quilt of present legislation
could be minimized by uniform statutes promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, or
otherwise. But there is little basis for such optimism. One reason,
of course, is that those states which have already acted on holder in
due course are unlikely to redraft their statutes solely in the
interest of uniformity. More seriously, the draftsmen of the first
proposed uniform act in this area, the 1969 Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, badly miscalculated anti-holder-in-due-course sentiment when they promulgated that act. The statute barred the use
of negotiable instruments, 0 5 but offered alternative provisions on
waiver of defense clauses: one would effectively prohibit their
use, 10 6 but the other contained a time-notice provision0° reminiscent of earlier ones in several jurisdictions.' 0 8 This fence-straddling
drew the ire of critics, and sent the draftsmen back to the drawing
board. The 1974 version now contains much stronger provisions'0 "
and treats the interlocking loan and credit card patterns as well.
But it may be too late to achieve any real uniformity in state law." 0
§ 21G (1975).
E.g., HAWAii REv. STAT. §§ 476-18(b), (d) (1968).
102 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25A-25(a), (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
103 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3809 (1973). For a discussion of other jurisdictions
dealing with this issue see Willier, supra note 86, at 139-40.
104 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12F (Gum. Supp. 1973).
105 1969 UCCC § 2.403.
106 1969 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A.
107 1969 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B.
108 See Hogan,A Survey of State RetailInstalment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38, 67
(1958); Willier, ProtectionInstalment Buyers Didn't Get, 2 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 287, 296-97
(1961).
109 1974 UCCC §§ 3.307, -.403-.405.
110 Not only did the first six states to adopt the UCCG-Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
100 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,

101

524

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:503

On a parallel track, but in response to felt inadequacies of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the National Consumer Law
Center offered its National Consumer Act in 1970, and in 1973 a
modified version called the Model Consumer Credit Act. With the
deftness of a blunt instrument, these proposals would retain consumer defenses and affirmative claims against holders of negotiable instruments, assignees, and interlocking lenders."' The
overwhelming partisanship of both the National Consumer Act
and the Model Consumer Credit Act probably preclude their
adoption intact in any state, but the National Consumer Act has
served as a provocative burr in the sides of the legislative processes
2
in several jurisdictions."
2.

Federal Provisions

If uniform legislation on the state level is a wan hope, there is
also only a fading prospect that comprehensive national standards
for retention of consumer defenses may soon emanate from the
Federal Trade Commission.
For five years or so the Federal Trade Commission has given
increasing attention to the plight of consumers whose obilgations
have been transferred to third party financers. First on a case by
case basis," 3 and then by general instructions to its staff," 4 the
Commission asserted that it is a deceptive or unfair practice under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act"' to deprive the
consumer of his product defenses in this manner. Then, in
197 1,116 and again in 1973,117 the Commission served notice of its

intent to issue a Trade Regulation Rule making it a prima facie
violation of Section 5 for any merchant-seller to enter into any
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming-split on which versions of § 2.404 they induded, but the
next three-Iowa, Kansas, and Maine-adopted versions only tentatively redrafted by a
committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
1974 UCCC, Prefatory Note, at viii, xv.
"I See NCA §§ 2.405-.407; MCCA §§ 2.601-.603.
112 See, e.g., MCCA iv (Introduction); Letter from Theodore R. Newman, Chairman,
District of Columbia Commission on Interest Rates and Consumer Credit, in Hearings on S.
1938 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1971); Davis,
Legislative Restriction of CreditorPowers and Remedies: A Case Study of the Negotiation and Drafting
of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REv. 3 (1973).
I" All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1 18,704 (FTC 1969); Household Sewing Machine Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,882 (FTC 1969).
114 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE

10,181 (1973).

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1970).
116 FTC Proposed Fair Trade Practice Rule, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
11 1973 Proposed FTC Rule.
11
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consumer transaction which purported to cut off the consumer's
defenses as against a third party who took up the obligation. The
1973 proposed rule covered notes, waiver clauses, interlocking
loans, and credit card plans, and was a blanket proscription of
holder in due course for all transactions involving "[g]oods or
services purchased or leased primarily for personal, family or
household purposes, including courses of instruction or training."'' 8
Hearings on the revised proposed rule were held in 1971 and
1973, and a massive record assembled, 119 but it has yet to be
officially promulgated by the Commission. This writer understands
unofficially that staff work on the rule is completed, including
some changes from the published version of the proposal, and that
the rule has been forwarded to the full Commission for action.
A sweeping Commission rule on this subject-aside from its
inherent merits-is fraught with unique problems, however. Although the Commission's authority to issue such rules having the
force of law is now beyond dispute, 120 there traditionally have been
limits both to the intrastate jurisdiction of the Commission' 2 ' and
to its authority to regulate banks. 2 2 The proposed rule attempts to
sidestep the latter difficulty by addressing its prohibition only to
the seller of the goods or services-making it unlawful for him to
participate in the outlawed financing arrangement and saying
nothing about the legality of the conduct of the bank or other
lender. As to the intrastate reach of such a Commission rule one
must speculate. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
has been amended to extend the Commission's authority to ac118 Id.

129 The collection of statements, articles, memoranda, correspondence, and exhibits
and the oral testimony from the 1971 and 1973 FTC hearings are paginated consecutively
within the same FTC document. FTC Record and Transcript of Hearings on Proposed
Trade Regulation Rule, FTC Docket No. 215-31-1 (Jan. 26, 1971) [written material hereinafter cited to FTC Record, oral matter to FTC Transcript].
120 Recent legislation, the Consumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, gives the Commission explicit rulemaking authority. Act of Jan. 4,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183. But the courts had earlier upheld the
Commission's assertion of implicit authority to issue binding rules. Cf. National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
221 FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (FTC held to lack authority under § 5 of
FTC Act to regulate any activity not truly interstate in character). Cf. S. OPPENHEIM & G.
WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 600-02 (3d ed. 1974). But see
note 123 infra.
222 Section 5(a)(6) of the FTC Act excepts banks, common carriers, and others from the
sweep of FTC authority to deal with unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 15 U.S.C § 45
(1970).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:503

tivities "in or affecting commerce," rather than merely "in commerce;" but there is still the possibility of a layer of purely local
123
financing beyond the effective reach of the Commission.
Additional problems flow from the notorious inadequacy of
the Commission's consumer protection budget, and the present
state of the law which holds that violations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act do not constitute private wrongs actionable by
individual consumers. 2 4 These factors in combination might tempt
unscrupulous sellers to see what they could get away with out of
the Commission's view.
While the proposed rule has stalled, Congress miraculously
has passed and President Ford has signed a bill' 2 5 limiting the
cut-off of defenses in credit card transactions. When Senator
Proxmire first introduced his Fair Credit Billing Act in the ninetysecond Congress,' 2 6 it contained restrictions on the holder in due
course doctrine in bank credit card transactions. Those provisions,
however, were rejected by the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs by an eight to seven vote, on the
ground that "this is an area of governmental policy which can be
effectively dealt with at the State level at this time.' 7 Undaunted,
Proxmire reintroduced the Fair Credit Billing Act, including its
anti-holder-in-due-course provisions, in the ninety-third Congress,' 2 8 and it was ultimately merged with several other consumer
credit proposals into an omnibus bill, 29 which passed the Senate in
July 1973. The bill then languished in the House Committee on
Banking and Currency and threatened to expire with the close of
the ninety-third Congress. Proxmire, however, was able to have the
bill added in conference to uncontroversial amendments to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and as Title III of the Depository
Institutions Amendments of 1974,130 it became law.
The contents of Proxmire's bill are discussed in more detail
123 The statutory changes were made in the Consumer Product Warranties and Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201, 88
Stat. 2183. The House Committee Report indicated that it was intended to expand FTC
authority to the full extent of the "commerce clause" of the Constitution, but not to preempt
local consumer protection activities. H.R. RE. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1974).
124 Holoway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. CocaCola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Gir. 1973).
125 FCBA § 170; see note 11 supra.
126 . 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
127 S. REP. No. 750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
128 S. 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
129 S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1973).
130 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500.
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below." 3 ' Suffice it to say that it compromises on the question of
the card issuer's freedom from consumer claims and defenses,
which are retained for the consumer only under certain conditions.
The Fair Credit Billing Act becomes a part of the Truth in
Lending Act, and pre-empts any state laws which are less protective
of consumers. And since Truth in Lending is one of the broadest
exercises of Congress' commerce power, the provisions limiting
credit card issuers' rights would presumably have plenary application to all such plans.
E.

Overview and Agenda
The sum of this review is that although holder in due course
may be under broadside attack in courts and legislatures, it is not
yet a defunct legal doctrine. No draftsman has been able to
assemble provisions meeting with universal approval. Exceptions
lace almost every statute purporting to limit or restrain holder in
due course. Present law is nonuniform, sometimes inconsistent,
and often unclear. The various- formulations of rules leave many
questions unanswered or produce new questions of great difficulty.
There is apparent agreement on a general proposition that the
reasonsfor holder in due course protection for creditors are often,
or even usually, outweighed by the reasons against that status. The
reasons against can be variously stated,'1 32 but they condense down
to the contention that, where the law recognizes holder in due
course, many consumers are unknowingly and unavoidably saddled by law with a payment obligation despite legitimate defenses
See text accompanying notes 191-92 & 202-16 infra.
132 Usually two grounds are urged in combination: (1) creditors who are subject to
consumer defenses will more carefully police the operations of retail dealers from whom
they buy paper, thereby-it is hoped-improving the level of dealer performance, and (2)
creditors can more readily distribute the economic losses resulting from defective goods or
services through their rate structure or by maintaining automatic cbarge-back rights, or
dealer reserves. Cf. Littlefield, supra note 6, at 492-96. These policy arguments make the
most sense, howevev, only against the backdrop of traditional financing arrangements,
where institutional financers buy consumer paper from many dealers, generally within a
limited geographical area, and where those institutions are presumed to have the skill,
personnel, and time to screen participating dealers and the freedom to adjust their rates to
reflect increased risk.
There is an additional and distinct ground for opposition to holder in due course which
is rarely articulated in judicial opinions-perhaps because it is so obvious. That ground is, of
course, to prevent the successful perpetration of the kind of joint fraud that occurs when
dealer and financer are both artificially created to deal exdusively with each other in a
concerted scheme to generate defense-free consumer paper. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 405 (1967); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1969); Timeplan Corp. v. Fuxa, 9 UCC REP'. SERV. 262 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
131
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such as fraud, breach of warranty, failure of consideration, and the
like, while a party better able to cope with these risks can be legally
unconcerned about them. The argument for retaining the doctrine
in some form is the classic theory of economic inducement: that
without being able to reduce their risks to finite proportionsthrough application of the holder in due course doctrinecreditors will not be able or willing to extend credit in the consumer marketplace. 133 Both lines of argument, and the assumptions underlying them, begin to disintegrate when they are applied
to other than prototypical facts. Why, for example, should financers object to increased risks if the rate ceilings in the jurisdiction
permit them to pass on any additional costs? On the other hand,
what goals are achieved by permitting a consumer to recover civil
penalties for Truth in Lending violations from a third party
financer? Still further, how is a local bank to police the operations
of thousands of merchants nation- or world-wide who accept the
credit card issued by that bank? These are the kinds of questions
now emerging, along with such speculative ones as how abolition of
holder in due course will really affect the supply and cost of
consumer credit, and how that abolition may inhibit the development of new technologies in the credit industry. It is to these
questions that this Article will now turn.
II
THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS

The judicial and legislative activity concerning holder in due
course is proof of discontent with the status quo, but the scattergun
nature of the reform efforts indicates tremendous uncertainty as to
where and how far the law should go. What follows is a series of
inquiries aimed at separating what is known from what is pure
133

It is hard to find a clearer expression of the perceived dire consequences of

abolishing holder in due course status than the following:
Lenders will be forced to litigate [many] issues which have no relationship to
the normal risks of lending money but instead are directly related to the quality of
the products or services sold or the performance of warranties by the seller. To
date, we know of no financial institution which has included such costs in its rate
calculations. However, if enforcing warranties or guaranteeing product performance is to be forced upon financial institutions as a cost factor, you can rest
assured that those additional costs will be passed on to the consumers of our
products through increased consumer interest rates or through restrictions on the
availability of consumer credit or both.
Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Statement Before the FTC in the Matter of Revised Proposed
Trade Regulation Rule, March 5, 1973, in FTC Record 6446-7.
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speculation, at determining what is feasible and what is not, and at
providing a basis for general agreement as to proper and comprehensive policy in this area. One general observation is required
at the start: it seems undeniable that successful resolution of holder
in due course issues must be by legislation, both to provide certainty to creditors and consumers in the conduct of their affairs
and to make meaningful whatever measure of consumer protection
is deemed appropriate. Continued reliance on decisional law to
protect consumers from loss of defenses is inherently self-defeating, for it requires the consumer to litigate, often extensively and
expensively, the threshold question of whether he shall be permitted to assert defenses at all. The varying treatments given by the
courts to such concepts as "negotiable," "good faith," "notice," and
"close connectedness" at least encourage creditors to seek protection by contract and to litigate challenges to their insulated status.
Thus, the rush to legislate concerning holder in due course in
consumer transactions is not only a fact but a necessity. What is not
so clear is the proper content of that legislation.
A. How Pervasive and How Pernicious Is the Use of Holder
in Due Course Protection in the Marketplace?
A considerable body of circumstantial evidence, but little of a
scientifically empirical nature, suggests that, when the law allows
creditors to do so at all, they will usually claim holder in due course
status and will do so most often when financing marginal or high
risk dealers and consumers in connection with purchases of relatively expensive items. The National Commission on Consumer
Finance put the matter in some perspective when it noted that,
although holder in due course devices were among the least
essential collection tools, creditors relied on them "to a significant
'13 4
extent in legal actions to collect defaulted obligations.
If one uses as a barometer the body of case law since the Unico
decision in 1967, one notes that the underlying transactions range
from sales of home improvements-the largest group-to those of
automobiles, television sets, furniture, special appliances, burglar
alarms, swimming pools, freezer-food plans, and photo albums. In
nearly every case the third party creditor is a finance company
rather than a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association. 13 5
Of thirteen automobile cases, for example, only one involved a
134

NCCF

REPORT

at 36.

135 By this writer's rough count of the post-Unico case law, better than 80% of the

creditors were finance companies, and less than 10% were banks.
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bank. 36 This fact is most curious, because 1973 Federal Reserve
Board figures 137 show that banks held nineteen billion dollars in
automobile paper, as opposed to only $11.9 billion held by finance
companies. Silnilarly, finance companies were the creditors in
fourteen of sixteen home improvement cases' 38 despite the fact
that banks extended more than four times as much home improvement credit as finance companies. 3 9 These ratios could be
read to mean that commercial banks either do not contract for, or
do not assert, holder in due course protection very often. But this
may be too generous an assessment, for the bankers, through their
trade associations, entered a vigorous defense of the doctrine
before the Federal Trade Commission. 40 It may be safer to say
that the case law reflects a disproportionate use of holder in due
course by non-bank financers.
The cases also reflect a recurring pattern of unsavory sales
transactions: door-to-door sales of shoddy home improvements,' 4 '
valueless freezer-food plans,'14 2 bogus referral sales' 4 3 -all of which
have become classic consumer frauds. These cases suggest not only
that deceptive and fraudulent sales practices force financers to
claim holder in due course status, but also that the ability to market
consumer obligations free of defenses may be the enabling element
in those unlawful schemes.
Some further inferences can be drawn by looking to see who
testifies against proposals which would limit or abolish holder in
13' Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W.2d 698 (1973).
117 60 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 47-48 (July 1974).
138 See, e.g., Tri-D Acceptance Corp. v. Scruggs, 284 Ala. 153, 223 So. 2d 273 (1969);

Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp., 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972); Financial Credit Corp. v.
Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967); Fuller v. American Aluminum Corp., 249 So.
2d 410 (Miss. 1971); General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
139 60 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 47-48 (July 1974). The precise figures are $3,982,000,000
for banks and $917,000,000 for finance companies, as of December 1973.
140 See American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n &
National BankAmericard, Inc., Statement Before the FTC in the Matter of Revised Proposed
Trade Regulation Rule, March 7, 1973, in FTC Record 6872-77; Consumer Bankers Ass'n,
Statement, supra note 133, in FTC Record 6340.
141 E.g., Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973);
United States Fin. Co. v. Page, 285 Ala. 645, 235 So. 2d 791 (1970); United States Fin. Co. v.
Jones, 285 Ala. 105, 229 So. 2d 495 (1969).
142 E.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971); Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1969).
143E.g., Gross v. Appelgren, 171 Colo. 7, 467 P.2d 789 (1970); Sentinel Acceptance
Corp. v. Colgate, 162 Colo. 64, 424 P.2d 380 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16
Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968); Commerce Acceptance, Inc. v. Henderson, 446
P.2d 297 (Okla. 1968).
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due course. Although their approaches differed, opposition to the
Federal Trade Commission's proposed trade regulation rule was
presented by representatives of commercial banks,1 44 finance companies,1 45 credit card issuers,1 4 6 automobile dealers, and other
merchants 14 7 -in other words, the whole credit industry. Their

arguments ranged from concern over Commission rule-making
authority, to the need to maintain "stability" in the consumer credit
market, to the fear by some small merchants that without readily
marketable consumer paper they could not compete with the giants
in their trade. Underlying these positions, of course, was the
unspoken assumption that they did in fact use holder in due course
1 48

devices.
Broad waiver of defense clauses were, until recently, universal
in multiparty credit card plans, 149 and the presence of these
144 See notes 133 & 140 supra.
145 National Consumer Finance Ass'n, Position Paper on Revised Proposed FTC Trade
Regulation Rule, March 2, 1973, in FTC Record 7085-89.
146 American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n & National BankAmericard, Inc., Statement, supra note 28, in FTC Record 6879.
147 E.g., American Imported Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Statement Before the FTC in

the Matter of Revised Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, March 5, 1973, in FTC Record
7009; John Hiatt of the Nat'l Independent Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Testimony, March 15,
1973, in FTC Transcript 1843; Nat'l Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Statement, March 14, 1973,
in FTC Record 7067; National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n, Comments to the FTC on
Revised Proposed Rule, March 5, 1973, in FTC Record 5966.
148 Some financers have apparently rejected use of holder in due course as a matter of
policy, but are unable to restrain counsel from relying upon it when undertaking collection.
Compare Household Fin. Corp. v. Mowdy, 13 Ill App. 3d 822, 300 N.E.2d 863 (1973), with
Richard P. McManus of Household Finance Corp., Statement, May 7, 1973, in FTC Record
7179. In that proud statement Household Finance declared:
Once a financing arrangement is established with a merchant, our agreement
requires him to repurchase any contract where the buyer declines payment because
of unresolved complaints concerning the purchase.
When purchasing a contract from a mercbant, we promptly contact the buyer
to ensure that he has actually received what he bargained for and is satisfied with it.
Complaint records for each merchant with whom we deal are maintained and
regularly reviewed. Our relationship is promptly terminated whenever fraud,
misrepresentation, or failure to promptly and honestly rectify customer complaints
is found.
Our complete confidence in the effectiveness of this program has caused us to
reject reliance upon the Holder-In-Due-Course Doctrine. We do not utilize this
doctrine in our business.
149 In the Master Charge Customer Agreement the cardholder agrees
[t]o adjust all "claims directly with any merchant Person [sic] or organization
honoring his Master Charge credit card, to waive and release Master Charge from
all defenses, rights and claims he may have against such persons, and to make all
required payments to Master Charge without reference to such claims or defenses.
American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n & National
BankAmericard, Inc., Statement, supra note 140, in FTC Record 6910. For the comparable
BankAmericard agreement see Hale, Holder in Due Course and Bank Cards, 5 UCC L.J. 164,
170 (1972).
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waivers may explain the lack of any decisive case law in which
cardholders assert defenses against card issuers.1 50 Moreover, the
array of patterns in which credit cards are used to finance consumer purchases is so wide-one commentator has identified
eleven different categories of credit card transactionsX15-that it is
impossible to know for certain which are even susceptible to attack.
Nevertheless, recent statutes in several states,'1 52 and now also the
Fair Credit Billing Act, have reinstated consumer defenses against
card issuers under certain circumstances.
The nature of the "specious interlocking loan arrangement"
makes it particularly difficult to judge the extent of its use, since
the connection between dealer and financer usually does not appear on the face of the paper. Allegations of cooperative efforts
between sellers and lenders have been made, 5 3 and one study
purports to show regular use of this device in one city. 54 Referral
of credit customers appears occasionally in the facts of reported
cases, 5 5 but has not been the explicit basis for decision in any of
them. This writer has heard, but cannot verify firsthand, that it is
common in the District of Columbia, where there are no small loan
150 The validity of such waiver clauses was challenged but not decided in Payne v.
United Cal. Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972).
151 Professor Leary listed these transactions before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Credit. His listing included transactions where the card issuer was itself the seller, or
affiliated closely with the seller; where the card issuer's mailings also solicited sales of
products; where the seller's mailings or advertisements invited use of one or more designated credit cards; where credit cards are accepted in home solicitation sales or at seller's
place of business. The categories were set out in what Leary believed to be the decreasing
order of the card issuer's alignment with the seller. 1973 Senate Hearings 150.
152 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747.90 (West 1973).
...Littlefield, supra note 25, at 272-73; Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of
Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 505, 513-25; Gerald Meola of
Baltimore Legal Aid Bureau, Testimony, March 15, 1973, in FTC Transcript 1871-72.
A student author indicates that direct loan financing of automobile purchases in
Pennsylvania has been common for some time. Comment, "Dragging the Body"-Deceptive
Automobile Financingin Pennsylvania: With ProposedLegislative Remedies, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv.
429 (1973).
I" Miller, An Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24
OKLA. L. REv. 427, 434-37 (1971). The reported study is ambiguous and incondusive,
however. For one thing, the limited survey was conducted by phone. Id. at 434 n.42. For
another, the total of dealers who arranged- referral credit apparently included those who
accepted credit cards. Id. at 435 n.45. Although one might agree that bank credit card
transactions resemble interlocking loans, credit cards present their own difficulties and
ought not be lumped in with the distinct category of referral credit devices.
155 Cf. Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973);
Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jarozewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Owens v.
Modern Loan Co., [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
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(W.D. Ky. 1972); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 1971).
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companies, for retail merchants to transport credit customers to
Maryland lenders clustered along the main streets just outside the
District line. The interlocking loan device may inconvenience the
seller by bifurcating the sale and loan arrangements and may deny
the lender normal recourse rights, but there are strong incentives
for its use-freedom from defenses, freedom from the generally
lower rate ceilings for sale credit, and freedom from other regulations such as cooling-off periods and collateral limitations. The
device is reportedly popular enough to have generated its own
jargon.

156

It is one thing to conclude that most creditors insert the
necessary holder in due course boilerplate in their consumer obligations wherever the law permits. It is quite another to know how
often creditors use that weapon to coerce payment from consumers
who have legitimate defenses but no manner of recourse against
the insolvent or out-of-business seller. There is evidence that Legal
Services attorneys have been able to settle approximately forty-five
percent of the holder in due course claims brought against their
clients,' 5 7 but the nature of those settlements is unknown, as is the
answer to the query whether either the financer or the consumer
could shift any of the loss to the original seller. In a number of the
post-Unico cases, it is specified that the original dealer was in fact
out of business or had fled, and the losing party simply had to bear
the loss. It is no doubt more than coincidental that in five of the six
reported cases in which the courts expressly noted the impossibility
of recovery over against the seller the judgment was in favor of the
consumer debtor. 5 8 But hardly any of the post-Unico cases included the original seller as co-defendant or third party defendant,
156 It is our experience that this kind of financing seems to be regularly
associated with the obtaining of down payments for used cars (known as "side
loans"), vocational schools and certain door-to-door selling operations. Small loan
companies seem to be particularly involved in operations of this kind. Indeed, the
industry has coined the term "dragging the body" to refer to the process whereby
the salesman gets the customer to the lender.
National Consumer Law Center, Statement (undated), in FTC Record 7044, 7051.
157 Speaker, Holder in Due Course-Burden of the Poor, 5 UCC L.J. 146, 148 (1972). The
OEO study reported 14,000 holder in due course cases from 59 Legal Services projects in a
single year. Said Mr. Speaker: "The magnitude of the problem indicated by this sample is
frightening." Id. at 147.
158 The five consumer victories were: Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739
(Del. 1969); Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. App. 1968); Kennard v.
Reliance, Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (1970); General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 NJ.
396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971); Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 90, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570
(1969). In the sixth case, Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W.2d 698 (1973),
the court noted the dealer's insolvency but found for the creditor.
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which suggests that the sellers were probably judgment proof or
otherwise unavailable in all of those cases. Why else would the issue
of third party financer insulation from defenses be so hotly contested? A small canvass of the attorneys in these cases confirms this
1 59

logical truth.

Even after consumers lose in court there may still be opportunities for post-judgment negotiation and settlement, 160 but there
is little likelihood that victorious creditors will compromise below
what the consumer is able to pay. And there is no way to calculate
how often assertions of holder in due course status extract payments from consumers without the need to litigate, in circumstances where the original merchant has disappeared.
The incidence of creditor reliance on holder in due course,
therefore, seems to rise along a curve paralleling the inherent
riskiness of the underlying transactions. Automobile cases are
common because of the range of defects, malfunctions, and nonrepairs which can prompt refusals to pay. Home improvement
cases also flourish because fly-by-night contractors proliferate. Such
is the case, too, with fraudulent or unconscionable sales where the
consumer victims are poor or gullible. And although there may be
ways for the consumer to contest or compromise a holder in due
course claim, there are undoubtedly many consumers who are
induced or required to pay without having recourse against their
sellers.
B.

What Effect Does the Abolition of Holder in Due Course
Have on the Cost and Availability of Consumer Credit?

A priori, the elimination of creditors' freedom from consumer claims and defenses means that those creditors will be
unable to collect some obligations they might otherwise collect.
Facing such a prospect, financers have several options. They might,
for instance, calculate as best they can their prospective lost revenues, adjust their rates-upward-accordingly, and continue financing consumer transactions as before. Or they might decide
159 Beyond the cases cited (note 158 supra), attorneys in eight others have written the
author that recovery from the seller was in fact impossible. These included both losing
financers and losing consumers.
160 If one can gauge from the smattering of informal correspondence this writer
received, the ingenuity of counsel is sometimes refreshing, although also ironic. In one case
where a woman's homestead was sold to satisfy ajudgment for home improvement costs, her
attorney was able to arrange for the original vendor to purchase it at the foreclosure sale
and sell it again to the woman, who never had to move out. In another, the debtor's
obligation was satisfied by furnishing free advertising space to the creditor in the consumer's
family-owned newspaper.
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that the increased risk makes it unprofitable to deal in consumer
paper when there are safer profits to be made investing in, say,
pork bellies or soy bean futures. Or they might attempt some
combination of these: slightly higher rates with a more discriminating selection of participating dealers. Theoretically, too, they might
insist on better quality control and improved sales practices to
minimize the instances of consumer dissatisfation, or larger dealer
reserve accounts to shunt losses back to the retailers.
16 1
Any one of these responses can produce effects superficially
disadvantageous to consumers-higher credit rates, reduced availability of credit, higher prices. Assuming the maintenance of an
economic policy that would assure the consuming public maximum
credit at minimum cost, the withdrawal of holder in due course
protection from financers must entail some compromise with that
policy. The proper question, then, is not whether the withdrawal
will be cost-free, but whether the costs are, on balance, reasonably
tolerable.
Most discussions slough over the possibility of significant
counter-effects from the abolition of holder in due course. It is
asserted,162 for example, that automobile financing in Pennsylvania
has continued unabated since 1937 without the crutch of holder in
due course, and that those states which have enacted such prohibitions have seen little effect on credit costs or availability.1 63 One
commentator experienced in the credit industry has said that in a
"reputable" market the holder in due course rule is "statistically
unnecessary."1 64 An economist claimed that the effect of the original Uniform Consumer Credit Code provisions on the consumer
161The disadvantages are only superficially so because it may be in the best interests of

some consumers to make credit more of a luxury. Significant value judgments are involved
in determining, for example, that consumers should have access to credit in the future as
freely as they have in the past, but no one seems eager either to make those judgments or to
propose legislation to implement them. The National Commission on Consumer Finance
admitted it could "devise no empirical method for determining who should get credit, how
much credit, what kind of credit, and at what price." NCCF REPORT 2. It also doubted
"whether legislators want to begin making the intricate social judgments involved in
designing laws to spell out" these matters. Id. One need go back no farther than the late
1960's to find evidence of economic and legal mayhem flowing from an overabundance of
credit: the explosion of unsolicited mailings of credit cards and the resulting prohibition of
such mailings and the imposition of maximum $50 liability for unauthorized credit card use.
See Truth in Lending Act §§ 132, 133, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-43 (1970); Hearings on S. 721
Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 4, 7 & 8, 1969).
162 Leary, Timely Demise of Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 UCC L.J. 117, 120 (1972).
163 Willier, supra note 3, at 143-44 (citing experience in Massachusetts).
164 Kripke, supra note 56, at 473.
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credit market was not likely to be substantial. 1 65 It is difficult to
quarrel with these judgments in the face of the obviously continuing growth of consumer credit nationally, at the same time when
many states are curtailing use of the holder in due course device.
But from other quarters come contrary assertions that the death of
holder in due course may spell the death of small merchants,'1 6 6 or

seriously undercut the utility and acceptability of bank credit
cards.'

67

Some less dogmatic voices can be heard. A study on the first
year's experience under a Connecticut statute eliminating negotiability in door-to-door sales found a marked reduction in institutional financing of such sales, a shift to repurchase agreements, a
cutback in incentive payments to dealers, and increased screening
of dealers and inspection of their work. From the dealers' perspective there was some noticeable difficulty in getting financing, some
resort to direct lending arrangements, and changes in marketing
practices, such as greater reliance on cash sales and wealthier
customers.1

68

The National Commission on Consumer Finance conducted a
Collection Practices and Creditors' Remedies Survey which, with
69
other data, produced conclusions similar to those just described.
Where holder in due course was prohibited there was an "observable reduction" in the availability of credit. This was true not only
for finance companies which traditionally deal with high risk credit
consumers, but also for the market as a whole. The Commission
surmised that this was because the rationing of credit by the
finance companies "would probably force out of the market many
retailers serving marginal risk consumers unable to obtain credit
from general market retailers,"' 7 0 thus decreasing the overall sup-

1'

Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code upon the Market for Consumer
Installment Credit, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 762 (1968).
166 One plain effect of this [prohibition of holder in due course] is that the
small, independent retailer -must capitulate to the larger, less credit-dependent
retailers. In an industry which already is a hilateral oligopoly, the significance of
the Rule is especially threatening: the small retailers must capitulate and competition among all retailers must atrophy.
National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n, Comment, supra note 147, in FTC Record
5966-67.
167 1973 Senate Hearings 242 (Joint Statement of American Bankers Ass'n, Consumers
Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n & National BankAmericard). Cf. Brandel & Leonard,
supra note 14, at 1068-71.
168 Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiabity
and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 637-53 (1969).
169 NCCF REPORT 23, 36.
1To Id. at 36.
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ply of credit beyond that withdrawn by the finance companies
themselves.
The conclusion that abolition of holder in due course has
contributed to a constriction of the money market cannot be
disproved. Indeed, some confirmation of it has come to this author
in correspondence with creditor attorneys who have handled-and
lost-recent holder in due course cases, and who note that after the
adverse decision either their clients or the originating dealers
withdrew from that consumer credit market. This diminished
availability may be a temporary adjustment to the onslaught of
anti-holder-in-due-course legislation. The National Commission itself doubted whether the repercussions would be as significant as
some predicted. 71' But if the consequences to the credit supply are
to be kept minimal, it will be because creditors are willing and able

to pass on the new risks to dealers in the first instance and
ultimately to the consuming public. In this regard, the Commission
noted that its recommendations for restrictions on creditor remedies were "inextricably interwoven"' 7 2 with other recommendations it made concerning rates and availability. These recommendations generally called for "realistic" rate ceilings-as proposed in
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code-and broad-scale encouragement of entry into the consumer credit market through such
means as relaxation of licensing requirements and possible federal
chartering of financial institutions.
The most likely prognosis, it seems, is that universal abolition
of holder in due course will produce instinctively careful reactions
from financers-some initial curtailment of their dealings in consumer paper followed by a gradual reopening of their coffers at
higher rates and with more stringent controls over participating
73
merchants.
171

Id. at 37, citing Cohen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code-A Designfor Disaster, 23

L.Q. 10 (1968). Mr. Cohen, a Chicago attorney, predicted that the UCCC
would lead to "economic chaos," and emphasized that abolishing creditor remedies like
holder in due course would cause "skyrocketing collection costs," and could drive the
less-creditworthy into the "waiting arms of the criminal credit grantor." Cohen, supra, at
10-12.
172 NCCF REPORT 24. The key recommendation was the following:
The Comission recommends that policies designed to promote competition
should be given the first priority, with adjustment of rate ceilings used as a
complement to expand the availability of credit. As the development of workably
competitive markets decreases the need for rate ceilings to combat market power in
concentrated markets, such ceilings may be raised or removed.
Id. at 149.
173 According to Professor Willier, this is essentially what happened in Massachuestts.
Wilier, supra note 3, at 142-44.
PERSONAL FIN.
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Whether the impact will be felt more in the cost of credit or in
its availability will depend in large measure on whether the additional risks of nonrecovery can be distributed to all consumer
debtors. It is, often assumed that increased costs can always be
"passed through" to consumers, but the assumption may be unfounded for many retail creditors or financers who find themselves
bound by rate ceilings on one side and competitive pressures on
the other. So, before presuming too much, one must be satisfied
that consumer creditors can fairly be charged not only with the risk
of increased losses but also with the resulting burden of distribution.
C. Does Abolition of Holder in Due Course Produce a More
Rational Allocation of Marketplace Risks?
American jurisprudence has created a universe of legal responsibilities for sellers of goods or services, and the liabilities that
flow from defaults in these responsibilities are intended by the law
to rest on the seller as a cost of his business. Abnormal losses
therefore occur when either the financer or the consumer is
required to pay for defective goods or services. It is the risk of
these abnormal losses that calls for attention, under first principles
of risk allocation which dictate that they should be borne by the
174
party best able to prevent and distribute them.
It is doubtless true that when holder in due course theory is
used to visit the costs of defective merchandise on the consumer
buyer, he has little if any power to distribute that loss. Presumably
an accumulation of such "rip-offs," expressed in terms of "cost of
living," could underlie a union's demand for a higher pay scale;
perhaps a doctor victimized in a credit transaction might reflect the
experience indirectly in a revised fee schedule. But the typical
wage earner must simply take the blow. Financers, on the other
hand, have broader, though not unlimited, opportunities to spread
the losses which would result from uncollectible paper.
Theoretically, the financ~r has several ways of distributing
projected losses. For one, he may charge more for his credit
directly to consumer borrowers or directly to the merchants whose
paper he discounts. This is not always a free option, however, for
his rates may already be at the legal ceiling. Open-end credit174 Risk allocation underlies much of the developing law in such apparently diverse
areas as products liability and securities fraud. A particularly intriguing analogy to financer
responsibility is the emerging liability of advertising agencies for deceptive and misleading
ads. See Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968).
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especially in credit card plans-is almost always offered at the
highest permissible rate, and creditors who have dared to cross this
line have been challenged. 7 5 Further, increasing his price puts the
financer at a distinct competitive disadvantage. For example, direct
bank loans for automobile purchases are generally cheaper than
financing through third party finance companies. 17 6 Abolition of
holder in due course, if reflected in finance companies' rates,
would only increase the disparity between them.
Alternatively, the financer can try to distribute losses by shunting them back to the dealer whose default caused the loss in the
first place and who presumably can redistribute them through its
price structure. The devices by which this may be accomplished
vary, and for some creditors, under some circumstances, may just
not be available at all. In typical transactions where the financer
purchases consumer paper regularly from a dealer, incentive payments are made to the dealer in the form of a percentage of the
finance charge. Many creditors maintain reserve accounts in which
accumulate portions of the discounted prices of consumer obligations. These funds are released periodically to the dealers as the
obligations are paid off, and thus represent a kind of contingency
fund from which the creditor can withhold amounts equal to what
it cannot collect from the consumer debtors. Either of these devices
can be manipulated to increase the financer's return and lessen the
dealer's, and the National Commission found it "logical to assume"
that financers would protect themselves in this way.' 7 7 In addition,
financers may purchase consumer paper on a pure recourse basis
78
whereby the dealer is a virtual guarantor of uncollectible items.
17- In the Washington, D.C., area Riggs National Bank operates a regional credit card
plan called Central Charge. Its monthly carrying charges were the typical 1.5%. When a
local attorney challenged these rates as exceeding the 8% usury limit in the District, the
court held the rate permissible under the venerable "time-price" doctrine. Kass v. Central
Charge Serv., Inc., 304 A.2d 632 (D.C. 1973). This holding required great straining of legal
doctrine, for time-price theory has historically been invoked only in transactions between
sellers and buyers. Indeed, courts have not hesitated at times to declare that the hypothecation of consumer paper from dealer to financer makes the entire transaction a loan for
usury purposes. Dunn Co. v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 275 So. 2d 311 (Fla. App. 1973).
While the Kass case was pending, Congress responded to the creditors' pleas by enacting a
monthly 1.5% rate ceiling for all revolving credit plans. D.C. CODE ANN. , 28-3702 (1971).
176 At the end of 1973, new car financing was available through commercial banks at
rates averaging 10.5% and through finance companies at rates averaging 12.4%; for other
consumer goods, bank credit was offered at 12.86% and finance company credit at 18.77%.
60 FED. RESERVE BuLL. A 48 (July 1974).
177 NCCF REPORT 37.

178 A typical full-recourse agreement for assignment of accounts or chattel paper might
read as follows:
We [assignor] warrant the payment when due of each sum payable thereunder and
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When negotiable notes are used, the dealer's indorsement leaves
him liable to pay the holder on dishonor 7 9 or liable to the holder
for breach-of-warranty damages even if the dealer indorses "without recourse.'

1 80

Thus, on paper there are ample devices through which the
financer can throw losses back to the seller, who must then worry
about redistribution. All of them, however, depend on the dealer's
agreeing to them and such agreement may not be happily tendered. One would think that if recourse rights are so easy to
incorporate into financing arrangements creditors would long ago
have insisted on them as universal practice-for what financer
would not want to supplement his primary, holder in due course
reinforced rights against the consumer debtor with secondary
rights against the dealer-assignor? Yet the landscape is strewn with
creditors who had no usable recourse rights.' 8 ' Were these creditors foolhardy, or is it equally possible that the dealer was the
dominant party whose wishes controlled? Moreover, even the
clearest of contractual charge-back rights can avail the creditor
nothing against the seller who has skipped the state or gone
bankrupt.
The interlocking loan pattern presents unique obstacles to the
lender who wishes to retain contractual recourse rights against the
seller. Since no paper flows from seller to financer, traditional
notions of indorser liability or warranty do not apply. Incentive
payments and reserve funds are possible, but more difficult to
structure. If the formally independent, but in fact related, lender is
denied holder in due course status he may be able to negotiate
indemnification agreements with his associated dealers. More useful to the lender may be efforts to develop a traditional legal
recourse theory such as unjust enrichment 82 or subrogation"8 3 to
the rights of the debtor. Perhaps the safest technique would be to
include in all consumer loan agreements a contingent assignment
the payment on demand of the entire unpaid balance in the event of non-payment

by the customer .. without first requiring assignee to proceed against said customer.
R. ANDERSON, supra note 20, Form 9:212, at 908 (1963).
179 UCC § 3-414(1).

UCC §§ 3-417(2)(d), (3).
See text accompanying notes 158-59 supra.
182 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162.
183 An analogous statutory right of subrogation already exists in the law of commercial

180
181

paper: The Uniform Commercial Code permits a bank which has improperly paid a check
over a stop-order to subrogate to the rights of the drawer (consumer) against the payee
(merchant). UCC § 4-407. The Model Consumer Credit Act posits a right of subrogation in
favor of the interlocking lender against the seller. MCCA § 2.604(3).
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by the consumer to the lender of his rights against the original
seller.
Credit cards are something else again. Precisely because the
bank card issuers are operating at the fringe of profitability and at
the ceiling rate, they can distribute losses only by charge-back in
one form or another. They might increase the discount rate at
which they take up the sales slips, forcing participating dealers to
raise prices for all credit card transactions. Or they might physically return disputed items through the clearing system and debit
an account of the delinquent merchant. Charges incurred in a local
area might involve only the issuing bank, while items from consumer transactions at a distance from the issuer could be returned
through the regional exchanges.
Card-issuing banks do insert charge-back privileges in their
dealer agreements. 8 4 Indeed, one compilation shows that they
8 5
return significant numbers of sales slips for various reasons,1
including a substantial number for missorting, expiration of cards,
lack of motor vehicle identification, erroneous amount, and missing signatures. But a large proportion-nine percent of the
total-were returned because "customer disputes slip."'1 6 Thus the
machinery exists for returning slips to the banks in which they
were deposited, and presumably for then charging them to the
accounts of the merchant depositors.
These returns, while obviously a bother, are further expedited by the use of Federal Reserve
routing symbols on the sales slips so they can be computer read
and processed.
To assess fairly the ability of various financers to distribute
losses, therefore, one must recognize that there are some limiting
184

An apparently typical BankAmericard Merchant Agreement contains this covenant:
Merchant agrees to pay Bank the total face amount of any Sales Draft, and
Bank will have the right at any time to charge Merchant's commercial account
therefor without notice, in any situation relating to such Sales Drafts where:

(e) the Cardholder disputes the sale, quality, or delivery of merchandise or the
performance or quality of services covered by the Sales Draft.
See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHrrE, supra note 2, at 436 (BankAmericard Merchant
Agreement
10).
185 In response to a question from Senator Proxmire, the president of the Interbank
Card Association submitted information on chargebacks among member banks. 1973 Senate
Hearings 262.
186 Id. The proportion of sales drafts returned because of customer complaints nearly
doubles, to 17% of all chargebacks, if one excludes the "missort" chargebacks. Id. A
'missort" apparently is a sales slip sent to the wrong card-issuing bank.
187 The president of the Interbank Card Association believed that most such chargebacks would be returned to the merchant involved, but also opined that many chargebacks
would be absorbed by the banks in the interest of customer relations. Id. at 259.
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forces at work in the marketplace: rate ceilings, possible restrictions
on reserve funds, 8 8 uncertain recourse by direct lenders, and
competitive pressures. It is then appropriate to allocate the risks of
defective products to financers rather than consumers only on the
premise that creditors often, or usually, have opportunities to
distribute losses-not on the premise that they always do. One can
also view the pressure to abolish holder in due course across the
board as a technique to put pressure on the rate-makers, and to
influence creditors to insist on workable recourse arrangements
with the sellers of goods they finance. In this light some proposed
statutes s 9 may be chargeable with overkill in that they seem to
disregard distributability as a criterion for denying holder in due
course status. And where distributability is downplayed, the case
for abolishing the doctrine must rest on the financer's greater
ability to prevent bad merchant practices at the threshold.
The National Commission on Consumer Finance concluded its
discussion of holder in due course with the judgment that
the costs of abolishing third party cutoff devices to all consumers
in the marketplace would be more than counter-balanced by the
protections which the consuming public will receive in the form
of better goods and services.19 0
If the hope is that the physical quality of consumer products will
improve, the Commission must be accused of naivet6. It is unrealistic to expect that sellers of goods and services-already subject to a
vast array of potential liabilities for intentional, negligent, and
faultless conduct-will materially improve their level of performance because banks or finance companies are looking over their
shoulders.
How can a financer police his dealers? He can investigate a
dealer's general reputation for honesty, integrity, and solvency. He
can periodically renew that investigation. He can insert into his
dealer agreements language like that in contracts between credit
card issuers and participating merchants wherein the dealer promises to "establish a fair policy for the exchange or return of
merchandise."'1 9 1 In home improvements, the creditor might insist
188 The Fair Credit Billing Act contains a prohibition against any card issuer requiring,
as a condition to participation, that member merchants maintain an account with the bank.
FCBA § 168. This provision prompted arguments from the bankers that it deprived them of
their only effective recourse against member merchants. 1973 Senate Hearings 226-27.
189 For discussion of the MCCA see text accompanying notes 193-99 infra.

190 NCCF REPORT 37.
191See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra note 2, at 435 (BankAmericard
Merchant Agreement

9).
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on completion certificates, or inspect, or otherwise verify completion of the work. But he can hardly run quality tests on all toasters
in the dealer's inventory, nor can he easily eavesdrop on the
automobile salesman's pitch. Transaction-by-transaction supervision of the dealer's goods and practices by employees of the
creditor is impracticable to say the least. The financer's ability even
to urge good practices or to influence the quality of goods or
services sold is dependent on his relative indispensability to that
merchant. Perhaps a large auto financer such as General Motors
Acceptance Corporation can indirectly influence these matters
through its and the dealer's corporate parent, but it is most
doubtful whether local lenders could do the same with respect to
area merchants, even where the revised Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, for example, would treat them as interlocked.
What financers collectively can do to police the market, however, is withdraw, or threaten to withhold, their credit supply
from merchants with bad track records. It is this power to cut off
the dealer's essential commodity that is the tangible policing
mechanism. In contrast to consumers who have at best the atomistic power to punish merchants who dissatisfy by refusing to trade
with them in the future, financers who regularly support the credit
operations of given dealers hold weighty economic billy clubs. To
the extent, therefore, that abolishing holder in due course is
justified on this ground, it carries the clear implication that financers should exercise that clout to freeze out misfeasant and malfeasant sellers even where it is not economically necessary for them to
do so-i.e., even where the financer can charge back all disputed
obligations. Risk allocation principles, in this context, are instruments of a positive social policy-the starving out of merchants
whose products or sales techniques cannot sufficiently and regularly satisfy legal norms.
D. What Degrees of Independencefrom the Seller Will Justify
Freedom from Defenses for Some Financers?
The theoretical answer to this query flows easily from the
discussion above: susceptibility to consumer product-related defenses ought not be thrust on a financer who genuinely cannot
effect the twin goals of risk distribution and prevention. But how
can one measure the varying capabilities of varying lenders in even
more varying credit marketing patterns?
At one extreme is the closely related, perhaps even affiliated
or jointly controlled, financer who regularly discounts consumer
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paper for the retail dealer. To the maximum extent any financer
can bear, distribute, and prevent losses, he does. At the other
extreme is, for example, the bank which makes an unsecured
signature loan directly to a consumer for purposes unknown to the
bank, and perhaps even unknown to the consumer beyond a
general intention to refurnish his living room. The bank is probably lending at the highest permissible rate, and has absolutely no
way to turn the uncollectible loan back onto the distant furniture
supplier with whom the consumer ultimately deals.
Hardly anyone would dispute the propriety of abolishing
holder in due course in the first pattern; even the most vigorous
proponent of consumer protection likely would not argue for
retaining defenses in the latter. But where between them is the
proper divide? Shadings exist even within the operations of a
single creditor: a bank credit card issuer stuffs advertising
brochures into its monthly statements inviting direct ordering of
products by return mail chargeable to the card account; the same
issuer lends its emblem to the media advertisements and storefront
windows of thousands of merchant-depositors in its national interbank system; it also issues blank checks to its cardholders which are
charged as loans to the credit card account but which may be taken
in payment by anyone. In the first two instances there is a structured relationship between issuer and seller; in the last there is
none. 1 92 A card issuer might, or could, assure himself of recourse
rights against the seller in the first two, but how could he in the
third?
A student author has argued that consumers ought to retain
defenses against otherwise independent direct lenders whenever
the lender knew the specific purchase to be made with the loan.' 93
The National Consumer Law Center's latest proposal similarly
hinges the creditor's liability on whether he knew or had reason to
know that the loan would be used in a consumer transaction; it
goes on to provide, in section 2.603(4), that the lender will be
"deemed to have" such knowledge when
(a) the lender is a person related to the seller; or
192

The new Fair Credit Billing Act would apparently treat all three differently. The

check-credit transaction would leave the consumer unprotected because his card was not
"used as a method of payment." Where the card is used in a retail establishment, the
consumer can assert defenses only if the transaction exceeded $50 and occurred within 100
miles of the cardholder's home. In the combined mailing situation, the consumer could
assert all defenses without dollar or location limitation. FCBA § 170(a).
"I Note, Direct Loan Financingof Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421-23,
1437 (1972).
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(b) the lender supplies to the seller or the seller prepares documents used to evidence the loan obligation of the consumer;
or
(c) the lender has recourse to the seller for nonpayment of the
loan through guaranty, reserve account or otherwise; or
(d) the lender directly or indirectly pays to the seller any commission, fee or other consideration based upon the assistance or
cooperation of the seller in the obtaining of the loan; or
(e) the lender makes payment of the proceeds of the loan to the
seller either individually or jointly with the consumer; or
(f) the lender conditions the extension of the credit upon the
purchase of goods or services from the seller; or
(g) the lender knew or should have known that the loan was arranged by the seller or a person acting on behalf of the seller;
or
(h) the lender and seller participate in any arrangement, formal
or otherwise, in which the seller refers consumers to the
lender; or
(i) the lender permits the reference to his services to be used by
the seller in connection with the consumer transactions; or
(j) the lender takes a security interest in the property which is
the subject of the consumer transaction; or
(k) the lender otherwise participates
in or is connected with the
9 4
consumer transaction.
Subsection (c) is the key to this provision, for it stresses the
distributability criterion. Other subsections-(a) through (i)-are
also justifiable because they imply or assume some prearrangement between lender and seller through which recourse
rights can be established. Subsection (j) would sweep in any lender
who took, as many do, 195 a valid security interest in the debtor's
"consumer goods" without knowing or claiming specifically the
items purchased with the loan proceeds. Subsection (k) is even
more dangerously broad and unspecific.
The difficulty in devising precise criteria can be seen in the
facts of a recent case in the District of Columbia. In Slaughter v.
Jefferson Federal Savings & Loan Association,'9 6 the court held that
the defendant lender was subject to the claims of a group of
consumers who had been victimized by the Monarch Construction
Company, a notoriously fraudulent home improvement contractor,
even though the Association had made direct loans to the consumers, rather than buying consumer obligations from the sellercontractor. There was no joint ownership, no supplying of docu194 MCCA § 2.603(4).
195 See, e.g., In re Turnage, 493 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1974).
'9' 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973); see note 51 supra.
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ments, no recourse arrangement, no rebate or kickback, no express
conditioning of the loan on purchasing from Monarch, no overt
"arrangement" of any kind. The lender did, however, take a
security interest in the consumers' residences, but these were not
even purchase money mortgages. The court stressed that responsible officers of the lender had failed to conduct adequate inspections of work in progress and had generally closed their eyes and
ears to the many suspicious circumstances of Monarch's activities.
Thus, said the court, 19 7 the lender had not.shown the requisite
good faith to be a holder in due course of the mortgage notes
payable directly to it.
The result might be the same under subsections (i) and (k) of
Model Consumer Credit Act section 2.603(4), but the applicability
of these provisions is uncertain. Subsection () would drag this
transaction in, but the retention of the security interest is the most
innocuous aspect of the whole transaction. Even if the current
District of Columbia interlocking loan statute applied to home
improvements, which it does not, 198 this transaction would slip
through because none of the criteria are met. The revised version
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, however, could produce
the same result as the court's because it would retain consumer
defenses against a lender where
the lender, before he makes the consumer loan, has knowledge
or, from his course of dealing with the particular seller or lessor
or his records, notice of substantial complaints by other buyers or
lessees of the particular seller's or lessor's failure or refusal to
perform his contracts with them and of the particular seller's or
lessor's failure to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time
after notice to him of the complaints. 199
Here the emphasis is not so much on the lender's probable ability
to secure recourse rights, as on his ability to police the seller by
denying financing to its customers. Thus this provision is consistent
with the risk allocation goals of distributability and prevention.
197

361 F. Supp. at 599.

198 According to District of Columbia law,
(a) A lender who makes a direct installment loan for the purpose of enabling a
consumer to purchase goods or services is subject to all claims and defenses of the
consumer against the seller arising out of the purchase of the goods or service if
such lender acts at the express request of the seller, and(1) the seller participates in the preparation of the loan instruments, or
(2) the lender is a person or organization controlled by or under common control
with the seller, or
(3) the seller receives or will receive a fee, compensation, or other consideration
from the lender for arranging the loan.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3809(a) (1973).
199 1974 UCCC § 3.405(I)(f).
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Regrettably, creditors and creditor spokesmen seldom offer
constructive criticism of proposals like these, preferring to point
out ambiguities in statutory language. 20 0 Any effort aimed at
picking out in legislation the fine points of distinction between
legitimately independent loan transactions and truly specious sales
can only be less than perfect. No two drafting efforts in this area
have matched, but it seems beyond dispute that some lending
patterns sufficiently involve the financer in the underlying sale
transaction to justify allocating to him the "abnormal" risks of the
seller's defaults. Proper legislative policy, therefore, would seem to
require, in any statute retaining consumer defenses against lenders, itemization of only those "interlocks" which clearly point to
such a course of dealing between lender and seller that the lender
could be expected to contract for recourse rights for its own
self-protection. This approach might require periodic amendments
of the statute as new financing patterns and new cooperative
techniques between lenders and sellers emerge. But it seems preferable to the alternative, which is a scattergun listing of every
conceivable connection between lender and seller supported
perhaps by a statutory right of subrogation which makes lending
institutions involuntary policemen of the conduct of merchants
20 1
with whom they have no regular contact.
A further word is in order here about the successful effort of
credit card issuers to keep almost all normal credit card transactions free from consumer defenses. Nearly every recently proposed
or enacted statute dealing with consumer defenses against credit
card issuers 20 2 would retain those defenses only if the disputed
transaction exceeds some specified dollar amount, 20 3 usually fifty
dollars, and only if the cardholder and his seller are within close
geographic proximity of each other. 204 The justifications offered
for these limitations refer to risk allocation principles. With respect
200 See, e.g., American Imported Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Statement, supra note 147,
in FTC Record 7025-26.
201 The Model Consumer Credit Act gives the interlocking lender a statutory right of
subrogation to the rights of the consumer. MCCA § 2.604(3). But, where the lender and
retailer have no regular course of dealing, this only means that once the lender has been
denied recovery against the consumer he has the legal right to seek out and sue the
defaulting merchant, hopefully with the cooperation of the consumer, whose testimony may
be critical. This would force lenders to act as public enforcement agencies. Preferable to this,
it seems, is a policy which induces lenders to do what is least burdensome-and least
expensive-to them, and which most nearly coincides with their own self interest--i.e., take
contractual recourse rights from those merchants with whom they do deal regularly.
202 These statutes include the new Fair Credit Billing Act. FCBA § 170.
203 Id. § 170(a)(2); see 1974 UCCC § 3.403(3)(a).
204 FCBA § 170(a)(3); see 1974 UCCC § 3.403(3)(b).
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to the geographic limitation, the bankers argue that the local
issuing bank cannot be expected to police the activities of distant
merchants in other regions of the interchange system, or could do
so only at the risk of engaging in boycotts considered unlawful
under the antitrust laws.2 0 5 However, the Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission doubted the possibility of antitrust violations, °6
and the bankers themselves concede that the mechanism for
charge-backs throughout the interbank system already exists.2 0 7 It
is difficult therefore to see any real basis for treating the card
issuer as a protected, independent lender on the simple basis of
distance. Although one can appreciate that banks would like, as a
matter of sheer convenience to themselves and their participating
merchants, to keep charge-backs to a minimum, a policy grounded
on creditor convenience would reinstate holder in due course in all
its glory.
The justification for the dollar limitation is more complex and
perhaps more meritorious-although when the average credit card
purchase is less than twenty dollars, 20 8 a fifty-dollar cut-off point
for asserting defenses means that the bulk of all such purchases are
defense-free as far as the issuer is concerned.2 0 9 The bankers argue
primarily that purchases for small amounts simply ought not be
treated as credit purchases at all, but should be considered essentially as convenient forms of cash transactions-"check substitutes."2 10 There is evidence that many consumers do use their
credit cards for convenience in payment, regularly paying off
balances at the first billing, without incurring any finance
charge.2 1' But it is patently self-serving for the banks to argue
from this that no consumer ought to be able to assert defenses
against the card issuer in small transactions where the seller's
205 1973 Senate Hearings 227 (testimony of D. W. Hock, President of National Bank-

Americard, Inc.).
206 1973 Senate Hearings 91 (testimony of Lewis A. Engman, FTC Chairman).
2'7See text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.
208 The American Bankers Association calculated that the average bank credit card
transaction rose from $18.20 in 1972 to $18.48 in 1973. 1973 Senate Hearings 202.
209 At one point the bankers urged a $100 cut-off point, conceding at the same time
that no more than 2% of all credit card purchases exceed that figure. 1973 Senate Hearings
228, 242-43, 260.
210 1973 Senate Hearings 243; American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n,
Interbank Card Ass'n, National BankAmericard, Inc., Statement, supra note 28, in FTC
Record 6912-14; cf. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 14, at 1049-51.
211 Estimates of the percentage of credit card billings paid in full within the free period
range from 33% to 53%. 1973 Senate Hearings 70, 228. Thus from one-half to two-thirds of
all credit card debt actually incurs some finance charge. Whatever the intentions of the
cardholder, he in fact enjoys "credit" from the time of his purchase.
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default, the consumer's dissatisfaction, and the bank's ability to
return the item are exactly the same as in larger ones. Other, better
ways exist to prevent overburdening card issuers with small complaints.2 12
In short, one cannot reasonably subject to consumer claims
and defenses any otherwise independent lender merely on the
ground that he knows or has reason to know the purpose of the
loan, without indulging a pure deep-pockets rationale on the
consumer's behalf. The crucial and important question, instead, is
whether the lender's relationship to the seller presents the lender
with reasonable opportunity to charge back consumer obligations
where there are proved or apparently meritorious defenses. Traditional credit patterns, where notes or contracts are taken by the
seller in the first instance and then transferred on to a financer,
clearly meet this test, as, it is submitted, do credit card transactions.
The growing concern for the "interlocking loan" ought not be
allowed to produce an over-reaction that ignores marketplace
reality and that may for that reason increase unnecessarily the
marginal cost and unavailability of consumer credit.
E. What Protection Has the Financer Against Large Numbers
of Frivolous Claims and Defenses?
Once holder in due course protection is stripped away, third
party financers are arguably vulnerable to alleged consumer defenses that in fact are groundless attempts to avoid payment. The
creditor has no way of resolving the consumer's grievance, nor can
he even judge its validity or speciousness without investigating the
underlying transaction. Creditors may legitimately feel, as the bank
card issuers do,2 13 that the only real option available to them when
a consumer refuses to pay is to charge the item back to the dealer.
On reflection, however, the likelihood of wholesale defaults is slim,
and the creditor does have other options.
Initially, there has been no hue and cry from jurisdictions
which have abolished holder in due course that deadbeat consum212 One of these is to limit the time for asserting claims against an open-end creditor to
the time when the debt is paid off, treating all credit card charges as paid off in the order of
purchase. Any cardholder who pays off his full bill each month would thus reduce the
issuer's exposure to a very short period, part of which we might assume would be used by
the cardholder to seek adjustments from the seller. See FCBA § 170(b); 1974 UCCC
§ 3.403(4).
213 American Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Interbank Card Ass'n, National
BankAmericard, Inc., Statement, supra note 28, in FTC Record 6919; cf., Brandel &
Leonard, supra note 14, at 1053-54.
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ers are taking tactical advantage of their newfound rights. It defies
human nature to think that there would be. Certainly consumers
can be expected, on 'the whole, to be no less honest than their
creditor counterparts.
Further, holder in due course is law for litigation-that is, it is
cranked in only after a consumer has defaulted and the creditor
has sued. From a narrow, lawyer's point of view, the viability of
holder in due course may make or break that lawsuit. For the
consumer whose auto transmission has disintegrated, or whose
roofing job is left half-done, it is doubtful that his first concern will
be whether he can successfully resist further payment. More likely
he will invest his first efforts in pleading, demanding, or negotiating with his seller. Only when these efforts fail, or on discovery of
the seller's disappearance or insolvency, is the consumer likely to
default. Certainly there is no reason to believe that any more
complaints would be taken up with the financer than with the
seller, and the good faith cure efforts that can be expected of most
sellers should reduce the flow of real claims and defenses to a
trickle.
Nor are the financers without defensive measures of their
own. They may simply determine that the consumer's position is
without merit and proceed to sue or otherwise seek recovery as
.before, for the abolishing of holder in due course does not create
defenses, it merely permits their proof. The secured creditor may
proceed to replevy his collateral, forcing the consumer to consider
whether he really wants to post bond, retrieve the property, and
defend on the merits. If the creditor repossesses by self-help, the
consumer must view his claim as worthwhile enough to retain
counsel and file suit on his own.
A particularly devastating device available to bank credit card
issuers is the right of setoff. If a defaulting cardholder maintains a
checking or savings account with the issuer, traditional doctrine
would permit the bank, without notice to the cardholder, to deduct
from those accounts enough to cover the unpaid credit card
balance. 2 14 The ensuing prospect of dishonored checks, extra service charges, and angry creditors is enough not only to chill the
consumer's thoughts of frivolous nonpayment, but also to suggest
214 See generally Dobyns, Banking Setoff: A Study in Commercial Obsolescence, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1585 (1972); Olsen, The Appropriation of Depositsfor Debts: Levies, Liens and Setoffs, 90
BANKING L.J. 827 (1973); Orr & Tedards, Bank Credit Cardsand the Right of Set-Off, 26 S.C. L.
REv. 89 (1974).
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that this unilateral bank weapon ought to be subject to some
2 15
reasonable controls.
In any case of disputed nonpayment there is also no requirement that the bank suspend its accumulation of interest, finance
charges, or late fees while the account goes unpaid. 2 16 This
economic inducement to consumer honesty is augmented by the
probable costs of defending a lawsuit, the possibility of legitimately
adverse credit references, or the justifiable cancellation of their
credit card. Indeed, to say that consumers are now able to assert
claims and defenses does not mean they can do so freely. The
abolition of holder in due course leaves the consumer-even the
consumer with a substantial defense-as open as ever to collection
efforts short of litigation. Only his chances for ultimate vindication
are improved.
If all this were not enough to reassure creditors against voluminous disputes, recent statutory proposals have added a salutary
extra precaution. That is, the consumer retains his defenses against
the financer only if he "has made a good faith attempt to obtain
satisfaction from the seller or lessor with respect to the claim or
defense. '21 7 This provision, it seems, makes no assumptions about
what is proper satisfaction, nor does it specify what steps the
consumer must take. It is no more than a rough marketplace
equivalent of the idea of exhausting administrative remedies, and
should not in any way inhibit the assertion of genuine defenses.
F.

Once the Barriers to Consumer Claims and Defenses are
Removed, What Should Be the Extent of the Financer's
Liability?
I. Contract-Related Claims and Defenses

In the middle of a twelve-month payment term a consumer's
color television set catches fire, destroying itself and the consumer's
residence. May the consumer now recover his extensive damages
from the third party financer? Can he at least recover the pay215 The Fair Credit Billing Act limits the bank's power here, but perhaps not by much.
It may require nothing more than a boilerplate provision in the parties' agreement that the
bank reserves the right to setoff. FCBA § 169.
216 The Fair Credit Billing Act is permissively silent on these matters. See FCBA § 161.
217 This language appears in virtually the same form in the 1974 Uniform Consumer

Credit Code and the Fair Credit Billing Act. 1974 UCCC §§ 3.403(3)(c), -.404(2), -.405(2);
FCBA § 170(a)(1).
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ments he has made-and what of the downpayment? Or must he
be content not to make any further payments?
Possible answers to some of these questions bring shudders to
the finance industry, but virtual silence from the commentators
and courts. In Unico v. Owen, 218 for example, the New Jersey court
specifically reserved the question whether financers would under
any circumstances be liable for breach of warranty damages, and it
has not returned to the issue in subsequent decisions. The original
Uniform Consumer Credit Code not only limited the financer's
liability to the amount owing at the time the consumer asserted his
defense, but it also insisted that the consumer await the creditor's
pleasure in bringing suit for the balance of the debt.2 1 9 The 1974
UCCC 220 and the new Fair Credit Billing Act 22 ' both limit the

creditor's liability to the amount owing when it first learns of the
asserted defense or claim.
On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission's revised
proposed Trade Regulation Rule would subject the creditor to
liability up to the "full amount" of the instrument, which was
interpreted to include all finance charges, insurance premiums,
and other fees. 222 A District of Columbia statute measures the
assignee's liability by "the amount owing . . . at the time of the

assignment," 22 3 or, in the case of interlocking loans, by "the
amount of the loan.

' 22 4

The National Commission on Consumer

Finance recommended that any holder's liability "should not exceed the original amount financed.

' 22 5

The Model Consumer

Credit Act begins by making the financer "liable to the full extent
218 50 N.J. 101, 123, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967); see note 2 supra.
219 1969 UCCC § 2.404, Alternatives A & B. The suggestion that the consumer had to
wait until he was sued by the creditor implied he could not take affirmative action to rescind
a contract or remove a lien on his property.

220 1974 UCCC §§ 3.403(3)(d), -.404(2), -.405(2).
221 FCBA § 170 (b).

222 The FTC would make it an unfair and deceptive practice to fail to give a consumer a
statement which said:
It is agreed that any holder of this instrument takes this instrument subject to
all claims and defenses which would be available to the maker in an action arising
out of the contract which gave rise to the execution of this instrument, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. Recovery by the maker under this

provision shall not exceed the full amount of this instrument.
1973 Proposed FTC Rule § 433.2(a). In an accompanying "Commission Interpretation" the
FTC construed the words "full amount" to include "all finance charges, interest, pre-paid
interest, charges for life insurance, and any other fees, charges or costs imposed upon the
consumer in connection with the financing of the consumer transaction."
223 D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3808(a) (1973).
224 Id. § 28-3809(b).
225 NCCF REPORT 35; id at 36.
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of all claims, defenses and equities of the consumer which arise
from that transaction. '2 26 This apparently is intended to authorize
affirmative recoveries for personal injuries and other consequential
damages, for the Act goes on to scale down the liability of "good
faith" financers to the "transaction total of the original transaction ,' 227 or the "amount of the proceeds of the loan used in the
consumer transaction. 2 28
There is obviously some need to reconcile these disparate
approaches if creditors are to have any chance to calculate their
likely losses and risks. But there is a more important reason to
reconcile them, and that is to crystalize exactly what policies are
being implemented by the abolition of holder in due course.
Where financers are subject to liability for all direct and consequential damages, in contract or tort, flowing from a consumer
transaction, those financers are made to act as insurers of sellers'
total performance; they are forced to become joint venturers in the
economic enterprise of marketing- goods or services. Where instead
financers are liable to the extent of all monies previously paid, they
may be viewed as stakeholders, guaranteeing at most the economic
value of that transaction to the consumer. But if the dissatisfied
consumer can legally do no more than defeat the creditor's right to
future payments, it must be because the creditor is seen as nothing
but a limited alter-ego of the original seller-a surrogate only for
the purpose of collecting payment. The measure of liability at least
ought to be consistent with the identified goals of risk allocation,
consumer protection, and marketplace policing, and there is no
reason to increase the creditor's exposure beyond what is necessary
to accomplish these goals. In fact, overextension of liability would
inevitably and needlessly increase the costs and lower the availability of consumer credit.
Under traditional doctrines-whose origins are deep in the
history of the law of contract 22 9-when a creditor cannot qualify
for holder in due course protection, he stands as a simple assignee
of the seller's contractual right to payment. He has not assumed or
been assigned the burden of performing the underlying contract,
and thus is commonly said to be "subject to ...all defenses of any
party which would be available in an action on a simple con226 MCCA § 2.602(1); id. § 2.603(1).
227 Id. § 2.602(2).
228 Id. § 2.603(2).

229 See 1 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 167(1) (1932); UCC §§ 3-306, 9.318(1); cf. 2 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY ch.

41

(1965).
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tract.2' 3 0 His maximum loss is the amount yet unpaid on that
contract. 231 There are almost no cases in which contract debtors
have sought refunds or other affirmative recoveries from third
party assignees, 23 2 although a recent commercial case concluded
that an account debtor may recover prior payments on a restitu233
tionary theory.
Yet a legislature can begin with a clean slate, and the question
remains open: what should be the extent of financer liability?
In the present state of the market, it is impossible to make
the case for full financer liability, as proposed in the Model Consumer Credit Act. Dealers and financers, despite considerable
hand-holding, are not yet recognized as partners or joint venturers.2 3 4 They are institutionally separate entities, under separate
managements, without identical economic interests. Sophisticated
legal-and insurance-structures exist to compensate consumers
for consequential personal injury and property damage where the
immediate seller is unreachable or judgment proof. Further, the
risk of such claims for a financer dealing with many merchants
selling a universe of goods and services is probably beyond calculation on any actuarial basis; if it is insurable at all, it is so only at
very high rates.
The case might more easily be made for holding financers
liable, not as insurers, but to the full extent of their investments in
individual consumer transactions. This practice would require
230

UCC § 3-306(b).

According to Professor Gilmore:
Between buyer and seller's assignee, however, the breach of warranty or failure of
consideration is available only defensively; if buyer wishes to recover his down
payment or his damages, he must go directly against his seller. The assignee, who
comes in to finance the transaction, does not thereby become responsible for the
assignor's warranties or prospective performance.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 229, at 1091-92.
2132 In one case, defendant-consumers counterclaimed against a financer for a refund of
the downpayment made to the merchant. The court rejected the notion that a local statute
permitted affirmative recoveries. Household Fin. Corp. v. Mowdy, 13 Ill. App. 3d 822, 300
N.E.2d 863 (1973). In a District of Columbia case, the court reformed the consumers'
contracts and ordered refunds of any payments in excess of the modified obligation.
Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590, 602-03 (D.D.C. 1973); see
note 51 supra.
233 Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. De Lozier, 178 Colo. 291, 496 P.2d 1016 (1972). The
theory, drawn by the Colorado court from Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953), seems to be contrary to that of the
231

Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14(2) (1936).
234 Such a contention with respect to a real estate financer was rejected by the California
Supreme Court in Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d
609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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financing institutions to refund collections received from customers
on proof of claims or defenses which justify rescission or revocation of acceptance, or which involve substantial consequential damages. There is some support for this formula in cases which accord
a debtor an unjust enrichment claim against an assignee who has
received payments under the mistaken belief that the assignorseller has satisfactorily completed his performance of the underlying transaction. 2 35 This thought must underlie the Federal Trade
Commission's proposal 236 and legislation such as that in the District
237
of Columbia.
But there are problems with this measure of liability, too. Since
the financer's liability at any given time would not depend on the
amount currently outstanding, consumers would presumably be
free to press claims against the lender any time within the pertinent statute of limitations, either in an action brought by the
creditor or independently in a suit by the consumer as plaintiff.
The passage of time could prejudice the creditor in his defense to
such a claim, and his closing of the books on that consumer
transaction might cost him any recourse rights he might have had
against the dealer.
There is an additional reason why neither of the extended
measures of financer liability is appropriate: they go beyond
reasonable consumer expectations and beyond what is needed to
preserve the credit-buying consumer's position against the original
seller. Consider the simple two party credit sale. With no independent financer involved, the consumer dissatisfied with the transaction can refuse to make further payments and force the seller to
take the initiative to recover any more. But that same consumer
always has the burden of suing the merchant to recover any
payments previously made. Should the seller disappear or fail, the
consumer must be content with his self-help recoupment. Any
exposure for the financer beyond the amount owing at the time the
consumer asserts his defense would therefore make the consumer's
tactical position against the financer better than that available
against the defaulting merchant. This windfall is difficult to justify.
If the proclaimed evil of holder in due course is that it denies the
consumer the tactical opportunity to withhold payments, the
proper response is to restore that balance and no more.
Thus it is not altogether surprising that the relatively moder235 See note 233 and accompanying text supra.
236 See note 222 supra.
237 See note 223 supra.
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ate 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code opts for a measure of
liability limited to the amount outstanding at the time the financer
learns of the asserted claim or defense. The consumer remains in
the identical position he would hold against the original seller.
Other observers have reached the same conclusion, for essentially
the same reasons.2 38 One estimated that probably ninety-eight
percent of the injustice wreaked by holder in due course can be
eliminated through this device. 239 What is surprising, in fact, is that
the most vigorous consumer spokesmen should suddenly veer away
from their support for limited creditor liability2 40 to propose, in
the Model Consumer Credit Act, a greatly expanded liability.
Once the basic extent of creditor exposure is settled, there are
still loose ends. Could a court in an appropriate case still order a
financer to refund payments received by "mistake"? Arguably it
could do so, on the theory that the legislation abolishing holder in
due course was not intended to displace equitable doctrines such as
unjust enrichment or restitution. 24 1 Should the consumer defenses
now available be limited to contractual defenses? The Fair Credit
Billing Act stipulates that assertable claims do not include "tort
claims, ' '2 42 an obvious concession to creditor fears that they might
be subjected to extensive personal injury claims. But the creditors
are protected to a considerable degree by the basic rule on
maximum liability, and this phrase in the statute arguably prevents
a consumer from justifying his default in payment on grounds of
fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, or strict tort liability. Legislatures considering similar language ought to avoid this ambiguity.
The best way to do so, in the view of this author, is to drop any
attempted specification of the kinds of claims and defenses retained. Against the original seller the characterization of the "de238 See United States Department of Justice, Comments on the Proposed FTC Rule,

June 11, 1973, in FTC Record 7124-27.
239 Professor MartinJ. Aronstein, Testimony, March 12, 1973, in FTC Transcript 1419.
240 In its statement to the Proxmire subcommittee, the National Consumer Law Center
opposed every qualification on credit card issuer liability except the limitation on the scope of
maximum liability. 1973 Senate Hearings 413. At that time the proposed Fair Credit Billing
Act subjected the card issuer to claims up to the initial amount of the original transaction if
the consumer notified the issuer within three months, but only to claims up to the amount
then outstanding if the cardholder notified the issuer more than six months after the
original transaction. S. 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 172 (1973).
241 The Fair Credit Billing Act, for example, specifically provides that it does not
displace state law unless that state law is inconsistent with its terms. Such state law cannot be

found inconsistent "if the [Federal Reserve] Board determines that such law gives greater
protection to the consumer." FCBA § 171(a).
242 FCBA § 170(a).
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fense" would make no difference, and the consumer's position
should be the same against the third party creditor.
Another matter of detail is how to compute the balance owing
in open-end credit plans. Both the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit
Code2 43 and the Fair Credit Billing Act 2 44 have settled on a "first
in, first out" rule that is both fair and easily applied. It deems
payments applied first to finance charges, then to purchases, both
in the order of entries to the account.
Finally, if the creditor's liability is to be measured at the time
he learns of the consumer claim or defense, it is critical that there
be workable guidelines to determine when such notice is received.
The key language in the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code
points to the time when "the assignee has notice of the claim or
defense. '2 45 Actual receipt of information is apparently required,
but notice has traditionally been broad enough to include constructive notice through suspicious circumstances and "reason to
know," and there is no reason to construe the term more narrowly
in this context. 24 6 Nor should it be necessary to prove some
affirmative act of notification by a consumer, for the requisite
"notice" might be acquired through the dealer'or independently by
the financer. 247 Clearly, the consumer can fix the financer's
maximum liability by giving notice before he attempts the required
good faith resolution of the dispute with the seller. Oral notice is
sufficient, but the creditor can insist on written confirmation.
These ground rules seem adequate for consumers who are
aware of their legal rights. But it could rationally be argued
that some consumers will fail to protect themselves and that
there is a need for explicit disclosure to consumer debtors of their
right to withhold payments upon notification of the creditor. The
proposed Federal Trade Commission rule incorporated such a
disclosure requirement, 248 and the Truth in Lending Act now
243 1974 UCCC §§ 3.403(4), -.404(3), -.405(3).
244 FCBA § 170(b).
245 This language, and that supporting the next few sentences, comes from 1974 UCCC

§§ 3.403(3)(d), -.404(2), -.405(2).
246 The 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not define "notice," but adequate
definitions can be borrowed from Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-201(25) and 3-304.
247 The Fair Credit Billing Act can be criticized on this point. It measures the card
issuer's liability only from the time "the cardholder first notifies the card issuer" of his claim
or defense, thus apparently requiring some provable notification action, and leaving open
the possibility that the card issuer will require written notice. FCBA § 170(b).
248 The text of the "Notice" is set out at note 222 supra. In addition, the FTC rule would
require delivery to the consumer of a separate, full page statement of his rights. 1973
Proposed FTC Rule § 433.3, -.4.
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requires semi-annual notification to debtors of their rights under
the new Fair Credit Billing Act.24 9 In truth, the difficulty and
probable futility of adding another complicated disclosure to the
paperwork of consumer transactions militates against such "protection," at least until such time as there is evidence of significant
abuse.
In sum, the objective of abolishing holder in due course is the
modest one of retaining defenses to the payment obligation. This
goal is attained by limiting creditor liability to the amount owing
when the lender learns of the claim and can take steps to protect
itself.
2. Parallel Tracks: Penalities and Direct Liability
Reducing the creditor's liability for contract-related claims and
defenses does not end the creditor's exposure. There are at least
two other possible sources of liability, which for purposes of this
Article will be merely noted and left for others to prospect more
closely. One is the recovery of civil penalties for violation of
consumer protection statutes such as the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code or the Federal Truth in Lending Act. The second is
the possibility-remote at the present time-that courts may find
financers directly liable for negligence or other misfeasance of
their own.
Numerous state and federal statutes now permit consumers to
collect civil penalties, unrelated to actual damages, from creditors
who violate protective provisions of those acts. The Federal Truth
in Lending Act prescribes penalties ranging from one hundred to
one thousand dollars, plus attorney's fees, for disclosure violations
and now also for violations of the Fair Credit Billing chapter. 5 °
The 1969 and 1974 versions of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code likewise call for varying penalty recoveries. 2 5 1 Can consumers
assert claims for these penalties as offsets or counterclaims to
reduce or cancel recoveries by third party financers?
In the case of Truth in Lending, Congress intended the
penalty provision to draw individual consumers into the policing of
creditor practices. Congress was equally aware that consumer obligations would often be assigned, and so provisions dealing with
249

§§

Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 304 (Oct. 28, 1974), amending Truth in Lending Act

127(a)(8), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a), (c) (1970).
250 Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a) (Oct. 28, 1974), amending Truth in Lending Act

§ 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
251 1969 UCCC §§ 5.202(1), (4), -.203; 1974 UCCC §§ 5.201, -. 203.
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assignees were inserted into the Act. Where the underlying transaction involves a security interest in real estate, the likely target being
the home improvement industry, the Act permits a penalty recovery
against any subsequent assignee of the original creditor where
the assignee, its subsidiaries, or affiliates were in a continuing
business relationship with the original creditor.., unless... the
assignee shows by a preponderance of evidence that it did not
have reasonable grounds to believe that the original creditor was
engaged in violations of this part, and that it maintained procedures reasonably
adapted to apprise it of the existence of any
25 2
such violations.

The original Act contained no other affirmative statement of the
liability of assignees, but a new section added in 1974 declares that
any action which might have been brought against the original
creditor "may be maintained against any subsequent assignee ...
where the violation from which the alleged liability arose is apparent on the face of the instrument.

253

Financers are therefore vulnerable to penalty recoveries, even,
apparently, in separate actions by consumers against whom the
financers have no offsetting claims. Some measure of protection is
afforded the assignee-financer by evidentiary presumptions set out
in the Act: for creditors required to give consumers special notice
of a three-day right to rescind, a written acknowledgment of
receipt "does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of
delivery thereof.' '2 5 4 Otherwise, in actions by or against the as-

signees, "written acknowledgment of receipt by a person to whom a
statement is required to be given . . .shall be conclusive proof of

the delivery thereof and, unless the violation is apparent on the
face of the statement, of compliance with this part. '2 55 Thus

assignees may be insulated from derivative claims for Truth in
Lending penalties so long as the consumer has executed the
25 6
appropriate "acknowledgment" and the violation is not obvious.
But troublesome interpretational questions arise from even this
2'52 Truth

in Lending Act § 130(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) (1970).
L. No. 93-495, § 413 (Oct. 28, 1974) (adding Truth in Lending Act § 115).
254 Truth in Lending Act § 125(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c) (1970).
255 Id. § 131, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (1970).
2'6 Some further help for creditors besieged by Truth in Lending requirements comes
through a 1974 amendment adding a new subsection 130(f), which relieves creditors from
liability for acts or omissions in good faith reliance on prevailing Federal Reserve Board
rules, regulations, or interpretations, even though those standards are later withdrawn or
invalidated. Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 406 (Oct. 28, 1974).
2"53 Pub.
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succinct statutory language. When is a violation "apparent on the
face of the statement"? Does "assignee" include the holder of a
negotiable instrument? Do these provisions state by negative implication the exclusive grounds for assignee liability and thus preempt
applicable state law such as the Uniform Commercial Code or the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code? What, for example, would be the
position of a finance company holding a negotiable note under
circumstances where its holder in due course status would be
defeated by its "close connectedness" with the seller, and where
there was neither a signed acknowledgment nor a violation apparent on the face of the note?
The exculpatory language of section 131 of the Truth in
Lending Act was given literal reading and application in a Georgia
case 25 7 where the auto-buying consumer executed a contract which
stated, directly above her signature, "Buyer acknowledges receipt
of a completely filled-in copy of this contract." When the consumer
claimed never to have received a copy of the contract containing
the required Truth in Lending disclosure, the appellate court
directed summary judgment for Chrysler Credit Company on the
grounds that the signed acknowledgment satisfied section 131, and
that there was no violation apparent on the face of the contract and
no evidence that Chrysler knew of any noncompliance. Earlier, a
federal district court had read section 131 equally literally, but with
the opposite effect, where a furniture contract clearly failed to
include certain downpayment information. 258 Here, said the court,

"[t]he failure to provide this information is apparent on the face of
the paper. Thus, the assignee has notice of the failure to comply
with the disclosure requirements. 2 5 9
The only other reported cases 2 60 construing the civil penalty
liability of third party financers unfortunately lose themselves in a
thicket of statutory brambles trying to fashion an elaborate "conduit" theory to justify imposing civil penalties on assignees. That
issue is now academic in light of the 1974 amendment to Truth in
Lending, 26 1 which specifies that assignees may be held liable.
257 Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, 126 Ga. App. 444, 191 S.E.2d 121 (1972).
258 Austin v. Ohio Furniture Co., [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
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99,610 (N.D. Ohio, 1970).

259 Id. at 89, 584.
260 Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Glaire v.

La Lanne-Paris Health Spas, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1974);
Philheck v. Timmers Chevrolet Co., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955
(N.D. 111. 1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
261 Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 413 (Oct. 28, 1974) (adding Truth in Lending Act § 115).
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Since Truth in Lending expressly preempts inconsistent state
law,2 62 it is doubtful that any penalty liability can be thrust upon
financers other than as the Act itself permits. But many disclosure
violations will arguably be "apparent on the face of the instrument
assigned," and in these cases financers can be subjected to settlement pressure, to setoffs, and even to affirmative recoveries. 2 63
And where the Act permits a consumer to rescind a real estate
credit transaction, there is authority that the financer is not only
susceptible to the rescission decree but can also be compelled to
refund any mortgage payments received. 6 4
Other civil penalty statutes can present variations on the same
theme. Penalties recoverable under the Federal Odometer Law, for
example, are substantial-thrice actual damages or fifteen hundred
dollars, whichever is greater 2 6 -but there is no indication in the
statute of special protections for financers of used cars sold in
violation of the Act.
The 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code provided an array
of penalty liabilities for creditors who violated its provisions. For
some creditor misdeeds, the consumer debtor was released from
any obligation to pay the finance charge and entitled as well to
recover up to three times that finance charge.2 6 6 If a lender violates
provisions on "supervised loans," the consumer need not repay
either principal or interest and can recover any payments made.2 67
Consumers were also entitled to prompt refunds of any charges in
excess of those allowed by the Act, failing which the debtor could
recover either the full finance charge or ten times the excess
charge, whichever is greater.2 6 For each of these penalties the Act
specified that they were recoverable either from the original creditor "orfrom an assignee of that person's rights who undertakes direct
collection of payments or enforcement of rights against debtors
262 Truth in Lending Act § 111(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1970).

263 The opinion in a recent case is instructive on these points. Hall v. Sheraton
Galleries, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 98,737 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Without apparent
objection, General Electric Credit Corporation was joined as a defendant in an action for
civil penalties for disclosure violations by the Galleries. information concerning collection of
attorneys' fees and acceleration of unpaid balances was on the reverse side of the disclosure
statement and this, said the court, violated the regulation requiring all Truth in Lending
disclosures to be in a meaningful sequence. Id. at 88, 336. For these sins the court
recommended awards of $100 against Galleries and $1,100 against the Credit Company. Id.
at 88, 338.
264 Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
265 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (Supp. III, 1973).
266 1969 UCCC § 5.202(1).
267 Id. § 5.202(2).
268 Id. § 5.202(3).
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arising from the debt. '2 69 Read at face value, these provisions
would permit counterclaims or direct suits by consumers against
third party financers for the full amount of the specified penalties,
regardless of the amount, or even the existence, of an unpaid
balance on the'underlying debt. The financers' only protections are
27
the "bona fide error" excuse 27 0 and the statute of limitations. 1
Against this background, the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit
Code introduces complications. The language expressly permitting
penalty claims against assignees is retained only in the section
dealing with recovery of excess charges.2 7 2 For violations of
twenty-two other provisions the new Act specifies that penalties
from one hundred to one thousand dollars may be recovered
"from the person violating this Act. '273 There is no mention of
assignees, and although presumably the draftsmen intended the
lack of symmetry, their comments shed no light at all on the
reasons for the differing provisions. Again reading the Act at face
value, third party financers are apparently relieved of considerable
potential penalty liability in what the draftsmen intended as a more
pro-consumer Uniform Consumer Credit Code. But there is more!
A subsequent provision of the Act states:
Damages or penalties to which a consumer is entitled pursuant to this Part may be set off against the consumer's obligation, and may be raised as a defense to an action on the
obligation2 7 without
regard to the time limitations prescribed by
4
this Part.

Still there is no mention of assignees, but the language can be
construed as more than a waiver of time limitations-it can be read
as a general authorization to consumers to use penalty claims to
defeat recoveries by financers. This interpretation would fit nicely
269 This language appears in each of the provisions cited above. Notes 268-69 supra
(emphasis added).
270 The 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code imposes no liability if the creditor can

prove that a violation is unintentional or the result of bona fide error. 1969 UCCC
§ 5.202(7).
2171Sections 5.202(1) and (2) of the 1969 Uniform Consumer Credit Code set one year
limits, while § 5.202(4) allows two years for recovery of excess charges on revolving charge
and loan accounts, and one year as to other accounts.
272 1974 UCCC § 5.201(2).
273 Id. § 5.201(1).
274 Id. § 5.202. The grammatical and substantive ambiguity of this sentence defies
belief. Is it merely confirming that consumers can assert penalty claims defensively, or is its
thrust that whenever a consumer otherwise has a penalty claim against his creditor he is
excused from the normal time limitations? Are the time limitations waived only if the
penalty is raised as a defense in a lawsuit, or are they also waived if the consumer at any time
deducts his claimed penalty from his bill?
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with the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code's provisions subjecting financers to "all claims and defenses of the consumer against
the seller," but only "to the extent of the amount owing" at the
time the creditor receives notice.27 5 Third party financers might be
unable to recover balances owing on the consumer obligation, but
they would not be subject to affirmative penalty liability beyond
that.
Thus there appear to be differing attitudes toward financer
liability for penalties in the Truth in Lending Act at the federal
level, and in the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code as a model
for state enactment. There may be some grain of justification for
holding independent financers to stricter account for violations of
Truth in Lending rules concerning disclosure of the basic credit
terms-which the financer may dictate-than for violations of
other protective provisions. In both cases, however, the threat of
penalty liability puts additional pressure on the financer to know
27 6
and to police the contracts and practices of his dealers.
Finally, a creditor with an eye on the horizon for potential
liabilities ought to consider the implications of the decision in
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association.27 Written by
Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, this
case lays the foundation for imposing on third party lenders a
substantial burden of due care in overseeing the activities of the
sellers they finance, from which burden an action directly against
the financer will lie for all direct and consequential damages caused
by his negligence. If the case portends so much, it merits a closer
look.
The defendant Association in Connor had provided construction loans to the developers, and purchase money mortgages to
consumer buyers, during the development of a tract of residences
in southern California. The slab foundations of the homes turned
out to be unsuited for the adobe soil. When they cracked and
shifted, causing extensive structural damage, a number of home
buyers sued the developer and the lender for damages. 27 8 The
A 1974 amendment to the Truth in Lending Act prevents a consumer from setting off a
claimed penalty against his debt until the creditor's liability has been determined in court.
Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(d) (Oct. 28, 1974) (adding Truth in Lending Act § 130(b)).
275 1974 UCCC § 3.404.
276 The National Commission on Consumer Finance specifically recommended
amendment of the Truth in Lending Act to make clear that assignees were liable for
penalties for obvious violations. It saw this device as easing the policing burden and expense
of public enforcement agencies. NCCF REPORT 190.
277 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
278 Id. at 856, 447 P.2d at 611, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
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question of negligent construction and resulting damage were
conceded by the time the case reached the California Supreme
Court, where the issues were whether the Association's involvement with the developer amounted to a joint venture and, if it did
2 79
not, whether there could be independent liability for the lender.
The Association's spirit of adventure must have peaked in this
case. It committed some three million dollars in loans to a development company called Conejo and run by two individuals,
neither of whom had any significant experience in the construction
of tract housing. It "warehoused" the real estate itself, purchasing
it in its own name and reselling it to the developers at a twenty
percent profit. Aware of Conejo's thin capitalization, the Association charged a five percent loan placement fee and a 6.6 percent
interest on the construction loans themselves. It reserved a right of
first refusal on all first trust loans to home purchasers, and collected an additional one or one and a half percent fee from the
developers for every such loan made. It reviewed the borrowed
architectural plans and specifications for the homes, but not the
foundation plans. "It was preoccupied with selling prices and
sales." 28 0 As construction progressed, the Association had its inspectors on the job site weekly, but their attention was given to
seeing that the superstructure plans were being followed and that
the Association's money was disbursed only for work completed. 28 '
There was in this arrangement no joint venture, said Chief
Justice Traynor. Despite the shared risk and shared control, and
although both the Association's and the developer's profits were
dependent on the overall success of the venture, there was no
'joint" interest; neither participant was to share in the profits or
losses of the other. Nor was there any contractual underpinning
for a joint enterprise. 2 82 But, said the court, even though the
lender is not vicariously liable for the developer's negligence,
"there remains the question of its liability for its own negligence."2 8 3
To answer this question, Traynor turned to California precedents on negligence liability without privity of contract, adopting a
six part test the court had developed a decade earlier:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant
279 Id.

at 856, 862-64, 447 P.2d at 611, 615-17, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 371, 375-77.
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will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among
which are (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defen28 4
dant's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.
Applying these criteria to Great Western the court adjudged
that the lender was "clearly under a duty to the buyers of the
28 5
homes to exercise reasonable care" to avoid structural defects.
Traynor's response to arguments of the Association that imposing
such a duty would increase housing costs, drive marginal builders
out of business, and decrease the supply of needed housing was
that these burdens were at best "conjectural. ' 28 6 He noted that
adobe soil conditions could be easily and cheaply identified and
remedied. Finally, observing that there were no local ordinances
requiring soil analysis prior to construction, the court stated:
If existing sanctions are inadequate, imposition of a duty at
the point of effective financial control of tract building will
insure responsible building practices ....
[T]he losses of family
savings invested in seriously defective homes would28 7 be devastating economic blows if no redress were available.
The considerations underlying direct tort liability for tract financers, then, are precisely those that pervade holder in due course
analyses-risk distribution and policing of merchant practices!

If the court's opinion is presumptively thoughtful and judicious, in the Traynor tradition, it is surprising that its reception has
been so unenthusiastic. The majority opinion drew strong dissents.
The California legislature rushed to the aid and comfort of the
lenders by passing a statute which would exculpate any real or
personal property financer from liability for defective products,
"unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender
outside the scope of the activities of a lender of money. 28 8 Nor has
28 9
the decision drawn any judicial following.
284

Id. at 865, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. 377, quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d

647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
285 Id. at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
286 Id. at 867, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
287 Id. at 868, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
28' CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434 (West 1970).
289 Connor has frequently been considered and rejected in cases involving real estate
financing. See Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); Callaizakis v.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:503

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to superimpose the Connor
rationale onto some of the holder in due course cases. When Unico
was formed exclusively to finance paper generated by Universal,
could not the financer be charged with responsibility to see that the
merchant's sales practices were reasonable and that it would not
default on executory contracts? 2 90 Could not the District of Columbia savingg and loan association whose officers blithely took
first trust deeds from Monarch victims after inspecting the "improved" homes, and knowing the outrageous contract terms, be
considered negligent toward the consumers? 2 91 Was it only "notice"
for holder in due course purposes, or might it not be negligence,
for the General Investment Company to purchase aluminum siding notes without inspection of the premises and without
asking for
2 92
a completion certificate signed by the consumer?
As a Pennsylvania court noted, 293 Connor might be effectively
overruled by statute in its state of origin, but it remains a viable
expression of common law principles, available for judicial adoption at a moment's notice. Its lurking presence in the background
of holder in due course debate ought to be acknowledged, and its
implications understood, for so long as holder in due course is not
uniformly abolished across the country, courts are free to bypass it
in favor of a direct liability, for negligence or otherwise, that will
compensate the injured consumer for all his damages. And even if
the provisions of the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code are
uniformly adopted, its limitations on financer liability could be
disregarded by courts choosing the Connor path.
III
PROGNOSIS

Holder in due course is not dead, even in its historical sense,
so long as different jurisdictions treat it differently in their courts
and legislatures and so long as it is not abolished root and branch
Astor Devel. Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 1963, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972); Jeminson v. Montgomery Real
Estate & Co., 47 Mich. App. 731, 210 N.W.2d 10 (1973); Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 226
Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973); Mortgage Associates v. Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis.
2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970). But see Kornitz v. Earling & Hiller, Inc., 49 Wis. 2d 97, 181
N.W.2d 403 (1970).
290 Cf. Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d.405 (1967).
291 Cf. Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590, 600 (D.D.C.
1973).
292 Cf. General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
293 Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 226 Pa. Super. 157, -, 313 A.2d 249, 251 n.4 (1973).
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in all consumer transactions-from home improvements to auto
sales to credit card purchases. In fact, to prolong the metaphor,
holder in due course is not a single organism slayable in a single
blow. It is a collection of legal traditions and rules and commercial
practices which merge into a single result: the insulation of financers from consumer claims. No assault on the doctrine can therefore succeed unless it is both comprehensive and uniform, and the
impetus for such an attack may need to come from the federal
level.29 4
Financing patterns will grow and change. As creditor protections like holder in due course are eliminated, marginal dealers
and financers may go with them. In that case, the share of the
consumer credit market held by the banks and by large institutional lenders will undoubtedly increase, creating a potentially
unhealthy concentration of market power in the hands of a relatively few dominant creditors and merchants. 2 95 Technology is

developing new fund-transfer systems as a result of which the line
between credit and cash transactions will fade. 2 96 As this merger
occurs, the fairly safe position of credit card issuers under present
law will probably need to be reexamined.
A proper line for distinguishing independent from interlocking lenders has yet to be drawn. Judicial attitudes from the past will
likely haunt the enforcement of the best legislative efforts, and it
can only be a matter of time before courts, in the face of egregious
facts, will begin extending creditor liability beyond statutory
bounds on theories of restitution or negligence or joint venture.
294 Momentum for comprehensive federal intervention clearly exists. The Truth in

Lending Act has now been followed in quick succession by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(t) (1970)) and the Fair Credit Billing Act (Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III (Oct.
28, 1974)). The National Commission on Consumer Finance has also recommended a
federal watchdog agency to coordinate compliance with existing laws. NCCF REPORT 58-59.
Senator Proxmire has become chairman of the full Senate Banking committee in the
94th Congress, and is likely to introduce legislation to strengthen the Fair Credit Reporting
Act and to regulate credit insurance. A comprehensive National Consumer Credit Act is also
on the drawing boards. Washington Star-News, Dec. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
295 Cautions against the danger of a credit oligopoly have been sounded loudly. See
NCCF REPORT 138; id. 219 (separate statement of Senator John Sparkman); Milton Schober,
Former General Counsel to NCCF, Statement, March 13, 1973, in FTC Record 6994, 6996.
296 See NCCF REPORT 205-12. Title II of the Act of October 28, 1974, established a
National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers and charged it to study, investigate and
.make recommendations for appropriate administrative and legislative action "in connection
with the possible development of public or private electronic fund transfer systems." The
Commission is to take into account the need to preserve and promote competition, the need
to prevent discriminatory practices and to afford confidentiality, and, last on the list, "the
need to protect the legal rights of users and consumers." Pub. L. No. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974).
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What is happening to holder in due course is a reformation, a
cutting away of old abuses and the hopeful structuring of a new
order in the consumer credit market. But, like other reformations,
this one cannot be fully implemented without corresponding
changes in other areas such as rate regulation, freedom of entry,
and consumer education. And like other reformations, this one will
undoubtedly produce divisions, schisms, heresies, and upheavals of
its own.

